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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Virginia B. Theisen *
I. INTRODUCTION
Once more, the past year yielded a wealth of developments in
the area of criminal law and procedure. The author has endeav-
ored to cull the most significant decisions and legislative enact-
ments, with an eye toward the "takeaway" from a case rather
than a discussion of settled principles.
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Appeals
In Congdon v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held a juvenile waived his right to appeal to the circuit court as
part of his plea agreement in the juvenile court.' The prosecutor
charged the defendant, a juvenile, with felony vandalism.2 He en-
tered a written plea agreement with the Commonwealth, which
provided for dismissal of the felony charge upon Congdon's suc-
cessful completion of the drug court program.3 The plea agree-
ment also provided that the defendant 'WAIVES or gives up' his
right to appeal the judgment to the circuit court.' The juvenile
court accepted this plea agreement, "confirmed the voluntariness
of Congdon's consent, deferred the disposition of the felony van-
dalism charge, and ordered Congdon into the juvenile drug court
program."' Over a year later, the juvenile court, upon finding the
* Senior Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Litigation Section, Office of the At-
torney General, Commonwealth of Virginia; J.D., 1984, Marshall-Wythe School of Law,
College of William & Mary; B.A., 1981, College of William & Mary.
1. 57 Va. App. 692, 694, 705 S.E.2d 526, 527 (2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. (citation omitted).
5. Id.
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defendant had violated the rules of the drug court program, ter-
minated his participation in the program, revoked the deferred
disposition, and found Congdon delinquent.6 Congdon appealed
the judgment to the circuit court, which dismissed the case, find-
ing Congdon made "an intelligent and effective" waiver of the
right to appeal.'
In the appellate court, Congdon argued his right to appeal from
the juvenile court to the circuit court could not be waived, but the
court of appeals rejected his argument.' The court reviewed a
number of constitutional rights that can be waived and noted the
right of a juvenile to appeal to circuit court is a purely statutory
right.9 The court noted that the majority of courts addressing the
issue have found express waivers of appeal enforceable,10 and
Virginia has held a criminal defendant can waive his right to ap-
peal if the waiver is a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiv-
er.11 Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the cir-
cuit court. 12
The Supreme Court of Virginia clarified its "right for the wrong
reason" line of cases in Perry v. Commonwealth, in which the
question was the extent that the appellee must advance an ar-
gument at trial to rely on that argument on appeal.13 The court
concluded that
[fjailure to make the argument before the trial court is not the prop-
er focus of the right result for the wrong reason doctrine. Considera-
tion of the facts in the record and whether additional factual presen-
tation is necessary to resolve the newly-advanced reason is the
proper focus of the application of the doctrine.14
In Perry, the issue was whether the police conducted a proper pat
down of the defendant.15 At trial, the argument centered on
whether the police officer had a reasonable basis to suspect the
defendant of being armed and dangerous and, therefore, patting
6. Id., 705 S.E.2d at 527-28.
7. Id., 705 S.E.2d at 528 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Id. at 694-95, 705 S.E.2d at 528.
9. Id. at 695-96, 705 S.E.2d at 528.
10. Id. at 698 & n.3, 705 S.E.2d at 530 & n.3.
11. Id. at 699, 705 S.E.2d at 530.
12. Id. at 699-700, 705 S.E.2d at 530.
13. 280 Va. 572, 579-80, 701 S.E.2d 431, 435-36 (2010).
14. Id. at 580, 701 S.E.2d at 436.
15. Id. at 576, 701 S.E.2d at 434.
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him down."6 On appeal, the court affirmed on an alternative
ground, that the officer had probable cause to arrest and, there-
fore, lawfully searched the defendant incident to the arrest. 7
Banks v. Commonwealth offers another example of how the
Supreme Court of Virginia applies "right for the wrong reason"
principles. The defendant challenged the seizure of a weapon,
contending the seizure was the fruit of an illegal search.'" The
Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld the search on the alternative
ground, not raised by the Commonwealth, that the search was
consensual." The supreme court reversed, concluding the "right
for the wrong reason" doctrine did not apply because the evidence
of consent was conflicting, and the record did not disclose how the
trial court "resolved the dispute nor indicated how it weighed or
credited the contradicting testimony" with respect to the issue of
consent.2 0
B. Collateral Review
Based upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Padilla v. Kentucky,2 1 Emmanuel Morris sought a writ of audita
querela and a writ of error coram vobis in the Alexandria Circuit
Court, and Wellyn Chan filed petitions for the same writs in the
Norfolk Circuit Court.2 2 The petitioners sought relief from their
sentences, which rendered them subject to deportation, based on
allegations trial counsel were ineffective in their advice to the pe-
titioners regarding the immigration consequences of their convic-
tions and sentences.2 3 The trial courts granted the petitioners' re-
lief, but the Commonwealth appealed the rulings, and the
Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgments.2 4
16. Id. at 576-77, 701 S.E.2d at 434.
17. Id. at 577, 701 S.E.2d at 434.
18. 280 Va. 612, 615, 701 S.E.2d 437, 439 (2010).
19. Id. at 616, 701 S.E.2d at 439.
20. Id. at 618, 701 S.E.2d at 440.
21. 559 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486-87 (2010) (holding that counsel's failure to in-
form the client that a conviction carried a risk of deportation rendered counsel's represen-
tation constitutionally deficient).
22. Commonwealth v. Morris, 281 Va. 70, 74-75, 705 S.E.2d 503, 504-05 (2011), peti-
tion for cert. denied, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 5486 (2011).
23. See id.
24. Id. at 74-75, 83, 705 S.E.2d at 504-05, 509.
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The court began its analysis by noting that while judgments
are final pursuant to Rule 1:1 for twenty-one days after entry of
the judgment, unless modified within that time period, the Rule
is not absolute. 25 The writ of audita querela and the writ of error
coram vobis, pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-677, "provide
exceptions to Rule 1:1 under proper circumstances."2 6
The law restricts coram vobis to correction of "clerical errors
and certain errors of fact."2 7 The errors of fact subject to review
are errors that render the judgment void, not merely voidable.2 8
The court identified the pertinent question for coram vobis as
"whether there was an 'error of fact not apparent on the record,
not attributable to the applicant's negligence, and which if known
by the court would have prevented rendition of the judgment."'2 9
Although ineffective assistance of counsel may render a judgment
voidable, "it does not render the trial court incapable of rendering
judgment."3 0 The court noted a possible successful claim of inef-
fective counsel, based on Padilla, if Morris and Chan had filed
timely habeas petitions, but both failed to do so."
As to the writs of audita querela, the court noted that while the
common law writ "continues in force today," it "has never been
[available] to modify a criminal sentence in Virginia."32 Thus, the
court concluded the petitioners could not use the writ for their
post-conviction attacks on their criminal sentences."
C. Collateral Estoppel
A jury acquitted Collin Anthony Rice of malicious wounding,
use of a firearm in the commission of malicious wounding, at-
tempted murder, use of a firearm in the commission of attempted
murder, and discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle, but,
25. Id. at 77, 705 S.E.2d at 506 (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 1, R. 1:1) (Repl. Vol. 2011)).
26. Id.
27. See id. at 78, 705 S.E.2d at 506.
28. Id. at 79, 705 S.E.2d at 508.
29. Id. (quoting Dobie v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 762, 769, 96 S.E.2d 747, 752 (1957)).
30. Id. at 80, 705 S.E.2d at 507.
31. Id. at 81, 705 S.E.2d at 508 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. -, 130 S. Ct.
1473 (2010)).
32. Id. at 82, 705 S.E.2d at 509.
33. Id. at 83, 705 S.E.2d at 509.
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simultaneously, the trial court convicted Rice of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon." Following his conviction, Rice
moved for reconsideration of that conviction on the ground that
principles of collateral estoppel prohibited his conviction.35 The
Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected his argument and affirmed
his conviction in Rice v. Commonwealth."
The court of appeals noted Rice based his argument on an as-
sertion that the jury, in acquitting him of the other charges, nec-
essarily concluded that he did not possess the firearm. 37 The court
recognized four requirements must be met for application of the
bar of collateral estoppel:
(1) the parties to the two proceedings must be the same; (2) the fac-
tual issue sought to be litigated must have been actually litigated in
the prior proceeding; (3) the factual issue must have been essential
to the judgment rendered in the prior proceeding; and (4) the prior
proceeding must have resulted in a valid, final judgment against the
party to whom the doctrine is sought to be applied.
The court of appeals held that these four elements "presuppose
a prior action."3 9 The court concluded the doctrine does not apply
to simultaneous prosecutions as in Rice's case and, thus, affirmed
the judgment of the trial court.4 0
D. Confrontation Clause
Courts continue to deal with the effects of the decision in Craw-
ford v. Washington." Crawford determined that the key concept
triggering the application of the Confrontation Clause is whether
the evidence in question is "testimonial."4 2 In Walker v. Com-
34. Rice v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 437, 441, 703 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2011). The
Commonwealth and Rice agreed that the trial court would try Rice on the charge of pos-
session of a firearm by a felon, while the jury would decide the remaining felony charges.
See id.
35. Id. at 441-42, 703 S.E.2d at 256-57.
36. Id. at 445-46, 703 S.E.2d at 259.
37. Id. at 442, 703 S.E.2d at 257.
38. Id. at 443, 703 S.E.2d at 257 (quoting Glasco v. Ballard, 249 Va. 61, 64, 452 S.E.2d
854, 855 (1995)).
39. Id. at 444, 703 S.E.2d at 258.
40. Id. at 446, 703 S.E.2d at 259.
41. See generally 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (holding that the right under the Confronta-
tion Clause of the Sixth Amendment "applies to ... those who 'bear testimony"').
42. See id.
632011]
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monwealth, the defendant, who faced a charge of larceny of an
automobile, argued that the prosecution violated his rights under
the Confrontation Clause when it relied on the National Automo-
bile Dealer's Association "blue book" to establish the value of the
automobile.4 3 The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that evidence
is testimonial if the prosecution initially produced it "for the pur-
pose of establishing or proving some fact at trial."44 The Supreme
Court of Virginia concluded the "blue book" was not a testimonial
document, observing that "[i]t is most improbable that the com-
pilers of the 'blue book' ever heard of Walker or the charges
against him and they certainly did not prepare the book for the
purpose of assisting the Commonwealth in securing his convic-
tion."4 5
Sanders v. Commonwealth addresses a situation where a phy-
sician fulfills a dual role by assessing whether a child has been
sexually abused, while at the same time providing medical treat-
ment to the child.4 6 A child abuse pediatrician, Dr. Clayton, who
worked at the child abuse program at a children's hospital in Nor-
folk, examined a girl under the age of thirteen.4 7 The physician
sent samples to the hospital laboratory, which in turn sent a
sample for testing to a laboratory in California." Based on test
results and a physical examination, the doctor diagnosed the girl
with chlamydia.4 9
The physician explained at trial that her duties are "multifac-
eted" and include determining the likelihood of abuse or neglect,
as well as treating the child." The defendant argued the trial
court improperly permitted testimony concerning whether the
child had a sexually transmitted disease because this testimony,
based on the lab report, violated his rights under the Confronta-
tion Clause." The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, focusing
on "whether the laboratory report as referenced in Dr. Clayton's
43. 281 Va. 227, 229, 704 S.E.2d 124, 125 (2011).
44. Id. at 231, 704 S.E.2d at 126 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.
, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2539-40 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Id.
46. 282 Va. 154, 166, 711 S.E.2d 213, 219 (2011).
47. Id. at 157, 167, 711 S.E.2d at 214.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 158, 711 S.E.2d at 214.
50. Id. at 159-60, 711 S.E.2d at 215.
51. Id. at 161, 711 S.E.2d at 216.
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testimony was created for medical treatment purposes or forensic
investigation purposes."" In this instance, the physician limited
her role to conducting a medical evaluation.5 3 She did not inter-
view the child because the clinic hired experts who interview the
children to determine whether sexual abuse occurred.54 Law en-
forcement did not request the testing.55 Instead, the physician re-
quested the test after observing a vaginal discharge.5 ' The pur-
pose of the test, the court noted, is to determine whether a certain
medical condition exists and, unlike DNA tests, does not provide
the source of the infection." Finally, upon receipt of the test re-
sults, the child received treatment. Under these circumstances,
the court concluded that "[t]he laboratory report was for medical
treatment purposes as it was created to permit Dr. Clayton to
medically diagnose and treat [the child] for sexually transmitted
infections.""
Because reports created for medical treatment purposes are
nontestimonial, "Sanders's Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses against him was not violated."" Moreover, unlike the
laboratory technician in Melendez-Diaz, no evidence showed that
the technician in California, who performed the test, knew the re-
sults would be used in a trial." Sanders requires a fact-specific
examination of a particular item of evidence to determine wheth-
er its admission would violate the Confrontation Clause.
The defendant in Aguilar v. Commonwealth argued the Com-
monwealth violated his Confrontation Clause rights because it
failed to produce an analyst and a laboratory technician "who
played preliminary roles in the DNA analysis."6 2 Forensic analyst
Catherine Columbo performed a preliminary screening to deter-
52. Id. at 164-66, 711 S.E.2d at 218-19.
53. Id. at 166, 711 S.E.2d at 219.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Compare Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S._, -, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532
(2009) (finding that the technicians were aware of the affidavit's evidentiary purpose),
with Sanders, 282 Va. at 166-67, 711 S.E.2d at 219 (finding that the technicians did not
expect the lab reports to be used in a trial).
62. 280 Va. 322, 326, 699 S.E.2d 215, 216 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3089 (2011).
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mine whether seminal fluid was present, and Nathan Himes
physically observed Columbo perform the tests.6 3 Columbo failed
to find any fluid, but Himes, the analyst who prepared the certifi-
cate of analysis and who testified at trial, located some DNA
when he separately examined the sample.64 Later, a "PCR/STR
technician," Melanie Morris, processed the samples by operating
certain machines, copied the DNA, and placed the sample in a gel
for Himes to analyze.6 5 Himes testified at trial that the DNA re-
covered from the victim matched the defendant.6
The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that, following Melendez-
Diaz, certificates of analysis indisputably are testimonial because
they contain "solemn declaration[s] or affirmation[s] made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact."67 Regarding Co-
lumbo, the court found "that her preliminary screening ultimately
had no role in the DNA analysis." Instead, Himes performed the
analysis. 69 Therefore, the certificates of analysis never included
the results of Columbo's work product. 0 "In other words, she did
not 'bear testimony' against [the defendant]" and, therefore, did
not violate the defendant's right to confront witnesses.7
With respect to the "PCR/STR technician," the certificates of
analysis "did not contain any notes or reports she might have
generated during the course of her work; and they did not report
any factual findings by Morris about the DNA analysis." 72 The
prosecution never presented any evidence from Morris "to the
fact-finder in a form 'functionally identical to live, in-court testi-
mony, doing precisely what a witness does on direct examina-
tion."'73 Thus, the absence of persons who participated in the test-
ing process, but whose testimony is not conveyed to the fact-
63. Id. at 327, 699 S.E.2d at 217.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 327-28, 699 S.E.2d at 217.
66. See id. at 328-29, 699 S.E.2d at 217-18.
67. Id. at 333, 699 S.E.2d at 220 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 537 U.S.
, , 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. Id.
69. Id., 699 S.E.2d at 220-21.
70. Id., 699 S.E.2d at 221.
71. Id. at 333-34, 699 S.E.2d at 221 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51
(2004)).
72. Id. at 334, 699 S.E.2d at 221.
73. Id. (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. _ 129 S. Ct. 2527,
2532 (2009)).
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finder in a document, or some other form analogous to direct ex-
amination, may go to the weight of the evidence, but it does not
constitute a Confrontation Clause problem.
In Satterwhite v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, after holding that traditional common law principles per-
mitted the admission of the victim's statements, examined
whether the Confrontation Clause barred the victim's dying dec-
larations." The statements came from a man who suffered inju-
ries from being "shot four times at close range. As he faded in and
out of consciousness, he identified the shooter as [the defend-
ant]."" The court concluded Crawford did not upend the
longstanding precedent admitting dying declarations." First, the
court observed the Supreme Court of Virginia answered this
question 150 years ago in Hill v. Commonwealth, holding dying
declarations admissible under the Confrontation Clause." Se-
cond, the court noted that Crawford "left intact many aspects of
the conventional understanding of the Confrontation Clause.""
Finally, cementing its conclusion, the court also found that the
Supreme Court, in dicta, repeatedly approved the admissibility of
dying declarations under the Confrontation Clause."
E. Deferred Findings
In Hernandez v. Commonwealth, perhaps the most controver-
sial decision of the year, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded
a trial court possesses "the inherent power, in the exercise of its
discretion, to take the matter under advisement and to continue
the case for future disposition, subject to such lawful conditions
as the court might prescribe."o The supreme court reversed the
74. 56 Va. App. 557, 559, 565-68, 695 S.E.2d 555, 556, 559-60 (2010).
75. Id. at 559, 695 S.E.2d at 556.
76. Id. at 567, 695 S.E.2d at 560.
77. Id. at 565, 695 S.E.2d at 559 (citing Hill v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 594,
607-08 (1845)).
78. Id. at 567, 695 S.E.2d at 560.
79. Id. at 567-68, 695 S.E.2d at 560 (citing Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358
(2008); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895)). For example in Mattox v.
United States, the Supreme Court stated that "[dying declarations] are rarely made in the
presence of the accused, they are made without any opportunity for ... cross-examination,
. . yet from time immemorial they have been treated as competent testimony." 156 U.S.
at 243.
80. 281 Va. 222, 226, 707 S.E.2d 273, 275 (2011).
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holding of the court of appeals and of the circuit court, both of
which concluded that such a power exists only if the legislature
authorizes it.8 1
A grand jury indicted Rafael Hernandez for the felony of as-
saulting a police officer, in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-
57.82 After both parties presented their evidence at the bench tri-
al, the defendant moved the court to defer disposition for a speci-
fied time, at the end of which the court would consider dismissing
the charge, in place of a conviction." The trial court found the ev-
idence sufficient to find guilt, and, "even though the case might
be an appropriate one for a deferred disposition, the court did not
have inherent authority to do so."" The Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia awarded an appeal and affirmed the judgment.
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the ruling, finding the
statement by the trial judge declaring the evidence sufficient to
support a conviction failed to constitute "a judgment of convic-
tion."8 6 The supreme court determined that "[u]ntil the court en-
ters a written order finding the defendant guilty of a crime, the
court has the inherent authority to take the matter under ad-
visement or to continue the case for disposition at a later date."8
The court did not decide, however, whether a trial court might
".continue a case with a promise of a particular disposition.""
F. Fugitive Disentitlement
The Court of Appeals of Virginia applied the doctrine of "fugi-
tive disentitlement" and dismissed the appeal in Reid v. Com-
monwealth." The trial court in Danville convicted Reid of posses-
sion of a firearm by a convicted felon and sentenced him to two
years in prison. 90 He posted a cash appeal bond with surety.91 The
81. See id., 707 S.E.2d at 275.
82. Id. at 224, 707 S.E.2d at 274 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (Repl. Vol. 2009 &
Cum. Supp. 2011)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 225-26, 707 S.E.2d at 275.
87. Id. at 226, 707 S.E.2d at 275.
88. Id. at 225, 707 S.E.2d at 274.
89. 57 Va. App. 42, 44, 698 S.E.2d 269, 270 (2010).
90. Id. at 45, 698 S.E.2d at 270.
91. Id.
68 [Vol. 46:59
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
conditions of the bond included appearing at all court proceed-
ings, remaining in contact with his attorney, appearing at all
docket calls, reporting every two weeks to the Danville Probation
and Parole Office, maintaining good behavior, and remaining in
Virginia.92 Reid agreed in writing to the conditions.9"
The court issued a capias because Reid failed to report to the
probation office and his probation officer was unable to contact
him.94 Reid also failed to appear at a preliminary hearing on a
new felony charge, after which the Commonwealth moved to re-
voke his appeal bond.95 The trial court revoked the appeal bond,
issued another capias, and after a hearing conducted pursuant to
a motion filed by the Commonwealth, declared Reid a fugitive
from justice." The prosecutor filed a motion to dismiss Reid's ap-
peal to the court of appeals because of the "Fugitive Disentitle-
ment Doctrine."9
The court of appeals applied the doctrine and dismissed the
appeal.9" The court found that for the doctrine to apply: "(1) the
appellant must be a fugitive, (2) there must be a nexus between
the current appeal and the appellant's status as a fugitive, and
(3) dismissal must be necessary to effectuate the policy concerns
underlying the doctrine."" The court of appeals cautioned that
trial courts must exercise restraint and only apply the doctrine
"where no lesser sanction or remedy is available."'o
G. Grand Juries
In Reed v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia held
the failure of the grand jury foreman to sign an indictment that
the jury returned in open court was an error in form only and did
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 45-46, 698 S.E.2d at 270.
95. See id. at 46, 698 S.E.2d at 270.
96. Id., 698 S.E.2d at 270-71.
97. Id., 698 S.E.2d at 271.
98. Id. at 58, 698 S.E.2d at 276.
99. Id. at 52, 698 S.E.2d at 273 (quoting Sasson v. Shenhar, 276 Va. 611, 623, 667
S.E.2d 555, 561 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id. at 57, 698 S.E.2d at 276 (quoting Sasson, 276 Va. at 623, 667 S.E.2d at 561)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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not nullify the indictment.'01 The grand jury indicted Reed for
eight crimes arising from a robbery and murder.1 0 2 Each of the
indictments contained a check mark indicating it was a "true
bill," but the grand jury foreman did not sign the indictments. 0 3
During pre-trial proceedings and at trial and sentencing, Reed's
counsel never raised an objection to the indictment based on the
lack of signature.1 0 4 Reed pled guilty to three charges "not directly
related to the robbery and murder," and a jury convicted him on
the remaining charges.1 05
Reed appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia and the Supreme Court of Virginia without raising the issue
of the unsigned indictments on appeal.1 0 6 Both courts denied his
appeal."o' Reed also unsuccessfully petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus based on allegations that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise the issue of the unsigned indictments.10
Additionally, "Reed filed a motion in the circuit court to vacate
his convictions" as void, based on defective indictments, and the
court sua sponte denied the motion.109 On appeal from that judg-
ment, the supreme court agreed with the Commonwealth's argu-
ment that the absence of the signature on the indictments was "a
defect in form only,"' and, thus, "when the indictments were re-
turned by the grand jury in open court, .. . this defect in form was
cured, and the indictments became valid instruments under
which to try Reed.""0 The court also rejected Reed's argument
that the indictments were fatally defective under Virginia Code
section 19.2-227.111
101. 281 Va. 471, 482, 706 S.E.2d 854, 860 (2011).
102. Id. at 474, 706 S.E.2d at 855.
103. Id. at 474-75, 706 S.E.2d at 856.
104. Id. at 475, 706 S.E.2d at 856.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 475-76, 706 S.E.2d at 856.
107. Id. at 476, 706 S.E.2d at 856.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 476-77, 706 S.E.2d at 857.
110. Id. at 478, 706 S.E.2d at 858.
111. Id. at 482, 706 S.E.2d at 860 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-227 (Repl. Vol. 2008 &
Cum. Supp. 2011)).
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H. Juries
In Saunders v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
addressed the issue of under what circumstances a jury, rather
than the court, may fix the punishment for a juvenile offender. 1 12
Charges of aggravated malicious wounding and use of a firearm
in the commission of the wounding were certified against Saun-
ders, a juvenile from the juvenile court.11 3 These charges arose
from the shooting of a cab driver named Greg Powell.11 4 Prior to
his scheduled trial in circuit court, Saunders filed a motion seek-
ing to preclude jury sentencing, should the jury find him guilty of
any charge."' The circuit court denied the motion."' Prior to the
certification and indictments for the offenses involving the Powell
shooting, the circuit court tried and convicted Saunders as an
adult for shooting into an occupied dwelling."' On that charge he
received a sentence of ten years in prison, with eight years sus-
pended."
The following year, the jury convicted Saunders of the charges
arising from the Powell shooting."' The jury sentenced him to fif-
ty-three years in prison, and the trial court sentenced him in ac-
cordance with the jury's verdict. 2 0 Saunders appealed the judg-
ment to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which granted the
appeal and affirmed the trial court's judgment.' 2 ' The Supreme
Court of Virginia granted the subsequent appeal.122
The court focused its analysis on two sections of the Virginia
Code.'2 3 First, the court noted that Virginia Code section 16.1-271
includes the following provision:
112. 281 Va. 448, 450, 706 S.E.2d 350, 351 (2011).
113. Id. Subsequently, "a grand jury indicted Saunders for these two offenses and also
for [a charge of] participation in an act of violence in association with a criminal street
gang." Id.
114. Id. at 450-51, 706 S.E.2d at 351.
115. Id. at 451, 706 S.E.2d at 351.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 451-52, 706 S.E.2d at 351.
121. Id. at 452, 706 S.E.2d at 351-52.
122. Id., 706 S.E.2d at 352.
123. Id.
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Any juvenile who is tried and convicted in a circuit court as an adult
under the provisions of this article shall be considered and treated as
an adult in any criminal proceeding resulting from any alleged fu-
ture criminal acts and any pending allegations of delinquency which
have not been disposed of by the juvenile court at the time of the
criminal conviction. 124
On the other hand, the court observed, Virginia Code section
16.1-272 provides that:
In any case in which a juvenile is indicted, the offense for which he is
indicted and all ancillary charges shall be tried in the same manner
as provided for in the trial of adults, except as otherwise provided
with regard to sentencing. Upon a finding of guilty of any chare, the
court shall fix the sentence without the intervention of a jury.
The supreme court ruled "the only plausible interpretation of'
the statutes is that "[s]ection 16.1-272 does not apply to youthful
offenders who fall within the scope of 16.1-271."126 The court held
that when Saunders appeared for sentencing on the convictions
arising from the Powell shooting, "[h]e had been previously con-
victed as an adult on an unrelated charge and given an adult sen-
tence. . . . The necessary conclusion, therefore, is that the jury
was correctly allowed to sentence Saunders on the three charg-
es."12 7
I. Speedy Trial
The tolling of Virginia's speedy trial statute occurs in certain
circumstances, including when the Commonwealth seeks a con-
tinuance and the defendant does not object. 128 The statute does
not specify whether the statutory time limit is tolled when the
trial court enters a continuance sua sponte and the defense does
not object.1 29 Under settled law, however, if a particular situation
is not covered by the express terms of the statute, courts may look
124. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-271 (Rep. Vol. 2010 & Supp. 2011)).
125. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272(A) (Repl. Vol. 2010 & Supp. 2011)).
126. Id. at 454, 706 S.E.2d at 353 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id.
128. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243(4) (Cum. Supp. 2011).
129. See id.
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to situations of a "similar nature" that also toll the time for bring-
ing the defendant to trial.1 30
In Howard v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether a continuance entered sua sponte by the trial
court, without objection by the defendant, is of a "similar nature"
to other continuances that toll the operation of the statutorily
specified time for bringing the defendant to trial."' The court rea-
soned that "every continuance postpones the trial date regardless
of the reason for the continuance or the identity of the moving
party."132 In light of this fact, the court concluded that "[b]ecause
a continuance entered by the court sua sponte has the same effect
as a continuance entered at the request of the defendant or the
Commonwealth, . . . a court-initiated continuance is of 'a similar
nature' and therefore is subject to the same requirements regard-
"1133ing objections as other continuances. In sum, a defendant who
wishes to preserve a speedy trial claim must object to the entry of
a continuance that the trial court entered sua sponte.
In Brown v. Commonwealth, the circuit court initially deemed
the defendant incompetent to stand trial. 13 4 Later, a clinical psy-
chologist at Central State Hospital mailed a report to the court
"opin[ing] that [the defendant] had been restored and was compe-
tent to stand trial."135 The psychologist sent the report by error to
the district court rather than to the circuit court.136 The report
came to the attention of the circuit court approximately seven
months after the psychologist mailed it to the general district
court.'3 ' The defendant contended this delay caused a violation of
the speedy trial statute.138
In analyzing the issue, the Court of Appeals of Virginia first
concluded that when the trial court continued the case for an in-
definite time, and the defendant did not object, that time did not
130. See Stephens v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 224, 230, 301 S.E.2d 22, 25 (1983).
131. 281 Va. 455, 457-58, 460, 706 S.E.2d 885, 886-88 (2011).
132. Id. at 460, 706 S.E.2d at 888.
133. Id. at 461, 706 S.E.2d at 888 (quoting Stephens, 225 Va. at 230, 301 S.E.2d at 25).
134. 57 Va. App. 381, 387, 702 S.E.2d 582, 584-85 (2010).
135. Id. at 387-88, 702 S.E.2d at 585.
136. Id. at 388, 702 S.E.2d at 586.
137. Id. at 388-89, 702 S.E.2d at 586.
138. Id. at 389, 702 S.E.2d at 586.
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count for purposes of the speedy trial statute.13 9 The court further
concluded that the report of the clinical psychologist did not re-
sume the running of the speedy trial clock, because under Virgin-
ia Code section 19.2-169.1(E), an order of the trial court finding
the defendant competent to be tried was necessary.1 4 0 The report
by itself did not suffice.14 1 Moreover, the court found the trial
court "promptly" determined the defendant's competence as re-
quired under Virginia Code section 19.2-169.1(E) because it acted
promptly when it received the report. 14 2 Finally, the court of ap-
peals noted that resuming the speedy trial period is not the rem-
edy if the trial court fails to promptly determine the defendant's
competency. 143
J. Withdrawing Guilty Pleas
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Bottoms v. Commonwealth,
addressed the standard for withdrawing guilty pleas articulated
in Justus v. Commonwealth.14 4 Bottoms, pursuant to a plea
agreement, pled guilty to two counts of construction fraud.'4 5 Lat-
er, having retained new counsel, the defendant sought to with-
draw his plea.1 46 He argued that not taking his medication for de-
pression "may have inhibited [him] from fully understanding ...
the proceedings."' Counsel later stated that the defendant had
some defenses to the charges.'4 8 Specifically, the defense counsel
contended the defendant lacked the intent to defraud because he
intended to perform on the contracts, but after discovering he
lacked the proper permits and license, he stopped working until
he could locate a qualified contractor to supervise the work.'4 9 The
defendant adduced evidence that he had completed part of the
139. Id. at 391-92, 702 S.E.2d at 587-88.
140. Id. at 392-93, 702 S.E.2d at 588 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1(E) (Cum.
Supp. 2011)).
141. Id., 702 S.E.2d at 588.
142. Id. at 394, 702 S.E.2d at 588-89 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1(E) (Cum.
Supp. 2011)).
143. Id. at 395, 702 S.E.2d at 589.
144. 281 Va. 23, 32-34, 704 S.E.2d 406, 411-12 (2011) (citing Justus v. Common-
wealth, 274 Va. 143, 154-55, 645 S.E.2d 284, 289 (2007)).
145. Id. at 26 n.1, 704 S.E.2d at 408 n.1.
146. Id. at 28, 704 S.E.2d at 409.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 29, 704 S.E.2d at 409.
149. Id.
74 [Vol. 46:59
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
work, hired workers, and purchased materials.' The trial court
denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, finding that "[t]he
record reveals a knowing and voluntary guilty plea with
knowledge of the consequences."15
On appeal, the defendant contended the trial court applied an
erroneous standard to his motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and
the Supreme Court of Virginia agreed. 15 2 The proper standard,
the court held, is whether "the motion to withdraw a guilty plea is
being made in good faith and is premised upon a reasonable basis
that the defendant can present substantive, and not merely dila-
tory or formal, defenses to the charges."'5 3 The court found it im-
proper to rely on the defendant's statements in his guilty plea col-
loquy when ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.'5 4 The
court reasoned that when making the motion to withdraw the de-
fendant necessarily repudiates those statements.' In reversing,
the court concluded that the defendant made the motion to with-
draw the guilty plea before sentencing in a timely manner and
raised the defense of lacking the fraudulent intent.156
K. Jurisdiction Over Crimes That Occur, in Part, in Other States
The decision in Goble v. Commonwealth addresses an interest-
ing jurisdictional point in an age of growing electronic com-
merce.'5 ' The defendant's listing of three mounted deer heads on
the Internet auction site eBay led to charges under Virginia Code
section 29.1-553, which prohibits the sale of wild animals or wild
animal parts except as provided by law.' The defendant posted
the heads for sale "on eBay from his home [in Virginia] and re-
ceived payment in Virginia ."15 After individuals purchased the
150. Id. at 30, 704 S.E.2d at 410.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 32-33, 704 S.E.2d at 411-12.
153. Id. at 33, 704 S.E.2d at 412.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 34-36, 704 S.E.2d at 412-13.
157. 57 Va. App. 137, 147, 698 S.E.2d 931, 936 (2010).
158. Id. at 143, 698 S.E.2d at 934 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-553 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
159. Id. at 147, 698 S.E.2d at 936.
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deer heads, the defendant shipped them from their location at his
father's house in Pennsylvania. 160
The defendant argued the trial court lacked proper jurisdiction
because the sales took place in Pennsylvania.16 ' In analyzing this
claim, the Court of Appeals of Virginia acknowledged the princi-
ple that "[a crime] must take place within this [s]tate to give our
courts jurisdiction."162 The court determined that the evidence
"failed to prove either (1) in which state the auctioneer an-
nounced the sale by the fall of the hammer or other customary
means or (2) in which state physical delivery of the mounted deer
heads occurred." 163 Therefore, "under the traditional view of ju-
risdiction," no "sale" occurred in Virginia. 6 4
The court then turned to whether an exception to traditional
jurisdiction, known as the "immediate result doctrine," applied to
the facts of the case.165 Under this theory of jurisdiction, "if an act
or acts committed outside the Commonwealth constitute key ele-
ments in the prosecution for the crime at issue, those extraterri-
torial acts, or the chain of events set in motion by them, must be
the immediate cause of the harm the Commonwealth seeks to
punish."'6 6 The court observed that no law or prior ruling re-
quired the crime to begin with extraterritorial acts."' The court
noted that the defendant "started the sequence of events culmi-
nating in the illegal sales inside the Commonwealth" when he
formulated the intent to sell and posted the items for sale on
eBay while in Virginia."' In addition, he received payment in
Virginia.169 Finally, the court concluded that "the Commonwealth,
which has the duty to safeguard its resources for all Virginians,
has a legitimate interest in preventing its deer and deer parts
160. Id. at 145, 698 S.E.2d at 935.
161. Id. at 147, 698 S.E.2d at 936.
162. Id. at 148, 698 S.E.2d at 936 (quoting Farewell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 475,
479, 189 S.E. 321, 323 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 148, 698 S.E.2d at 936-37 (citation omitted).
166. Id. at 150, 698 S.E.2d at 937.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 151-52, 698 S.E.2d at 938.
169. Id. at 152, 698 S.E.2d at 938.
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from being sold in a manner that violates Virginia statutes and
regulations."17o
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Exigent Circumstances
Ordinarily, police officers cannot enter a home without first ob-
taining a warrant. 171 One exception to this general rule is the doc-
trine of exigent circumstances.172 At issue in Smith v. Common-
wealth was whether exigent circumstances justified the police
entry. '7 An anonymous caller contacted the police and stated that
a white male drug dealer, Jimmy Smith, was at the dealer's resi-
dence distributing drugs to an African American male."' Re-
sponding to the call, an officer quickly went to the named address
and knocked on the door.'7 Upon identifying himself as a police
officer, the officer looked through the partially opened door and
observed an African American male spring up from a couch.7
The officer noticed a small white object in the male's hand, but
the officer could not identify the precise nature of the object. 77
The officer pushed his way in, ran after the man, placed him in
investigative detention, and walked him back through Smith's
apartment. 7s In Smith's living room, the officer noticed, in plain
view, a number of smoking devices, including one later deter-
mined to contain cocaine residue.17 9
170. Id.
171. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) ("In terms that apply equally to sei-
zures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line
at the entrance to the house.").
172. Id. ("Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold [to the home] may not reasona-
bly be crossed without a warrant."); Verez v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 405, 410-11, 337
S.E.2d 749, 752-53 (listing ten exigent circumstances that might justify a warrantless en-
try, including "the officers' reasonable belief that contraband is about to be removed or de-
stroyed").
173. 56 Va. App. 592, 596, 696 S.E.2d 211, 212-13 (2010).
174. Id., 696 S.E.2d at 213.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 596-97, 696 S.E.2d at 213.
178. Id. at 597, 696 S.E.2d at 213.
179. Id.
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The Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld the seizure of the
items.180 First, the court concluded that exigent circumstances ex-
isted."'1 The court observed that one purpose of the doctrine of ex-
igent circumstances is to preserve evidence of a crime.18 To seize
evidence, the officer need not obtain "concrete proof that the oc-
cupants of the room [are] on the verge of destroying evidence."18 3
It is sufficient for the officer to reasonably believe an item consti-
tutes evidence of a crime.18 Due to the anonymous tip of drug
dealing, the sudden flight of the African American male at the of-
ficer's arrival, and the presence of a white object in the man's
hand, the court concluded the officer reasonably believed the de-
struction of evidence might occur."
A second closely related requirement is the existence of proba-
ble cause.18 6 Although the tip was anonymous, the officer corrobo-
rated the tip when he observed the actions through the open
door."' Therefore, the court concluded that the facts were suffi-
cient to establish the presence of probable cause.188
B. Search
In Watts v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
reversed and remanded the defendant's conviction for possession
of cocaine and marijuana.8"' The court determined the definition
of "abandonment" used in property law was not the correct defini-
tion to apply in Fourth Amendment analysis.1 9 0 In the latter con-
text, an individual's "intent to retain a reasonable expectation of
180. See id. at 606, 696 S.E.2d at 218.
181. Id. at 598-99, 696 S.E.2d at 214.
182. Id. at 598, 696 S.E.2d at 214.
183. Id. at 599, 696 S.E.2d at 214 (quoting United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778
(4th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Id.
185. See id. at 600, 696 S.E.2d at 214-15.
186. Id., 696 S.E.2d at 215.
187. Id. at 603, 606, 696 S.E.2d at 216-18.
188. Id. at 606, 696 S.E.2d at 217-18.
189. 57 Va. App. 217, 222, 700 S.E.2d 480, 483 (2010).
190. Id. at 228, 700 S.E.2d at 485 (citing Commonwealth v. Holloway, 9 Va. App. 11,
18, 384 S.E.2d 99, 103 (1989)).
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privacy '[governs] whether the property has been abandoned'
[and] is to be determined by objective standards." 91
In Watts, a Norfolk police officer saw the defendant driving a
car "with a peeling inspection sticker, a missing front license
plate, and a temporary rear license tag" into a private apartment
complex lot.'9 2 Watts parked the car and began walking away
from it.'9 3 During an encounter with Watts, the officer saw a
bulge in Watts's waistband, which the officer believed might be a
weapon.'9 4 After he advised Watts he was going to conduct a pat
down, Watts fled."' When the officer returned to the apartment
parking lot, he spoke to some residents standing in the parking
lot. 196
A check on the car's temporary tag revealed a car company
owned the car.'97 The officer decided to tow the car because it oc-
cupied a space that a resident of the apartments used."' In prep-
aration for the tow, the officer searched the car and discovered
marijuana and crack cocaine when he opened the loose center
console.' 9 Based on other contents of the car, including photo-
graphs, the officer discerned Watts's identity.2 0 0
At a hearing on Watts's motion to suppress the drugs, "the
Commonwealth argued [Watts] abandoned the [car] when he fled
and, thus, . . . he lacked standing to contest the search."2 0 ' The
circuit court denied the suppression motion.2 02 The court of ap-
peals, however, found that Watts did not abandon the car because
he "neither denied ownership of the car nor relinquished physical
control of it[,]" and the evidence failed to prove that "[Watts]
lacked authority to park where he did."2 03 While the officer spoke
191. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Holloway, 9 Va. App. at 18, 384 S.E.2d at
103)).
192. Id. at 223, 700 S.E.2d at 483.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 224, 700 S.E.2d at 483.
195. Id.
196. Id., 700 S.E.2d at 483-84.
197. Id., 700 S.E.2d at 484.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 224-25, 700 S.E.2d at 484.
200. Id. at 225, 700 S.E.2d at 484.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 229-30, 700 S.E.2d at 486.
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to some of the residents of the apartments, he did not speak to all
residents, and he never spoke to a manager of the apartments.2 04
The court concluded the evidence failed to establish that Watts
intended to abandon the vehicle when he fled from the officer.2 05
In Redmond v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virgin-
ia upheld the ruling of the trial court, which denied Redmond's
motion to suppress and affirmed Redmond's conviction for posses-
sion of a firearm by a convicted felon."' An Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms officer received information that Redmond, a convicted
felon, possessed firearms in his home that were for sale.2 07 The of-
ficer contacted the real estate agent and arranged to view the
home but did not inform the real estate agent that he was a law
enforcement officer. 20 8 Two officers viewed the home and saw sev-
eral guns in a gun cabinet, located in the den, as well as ammuni-
tion.20 9 Based on these observations, one of the officers prepared
an affidavit for a search warrant.21 0 A magistrate issued a search
warrant, and police seized guns and ammunition pursuant to the
warrant.211
Redmond moved to suppress the seized evidence on the ground
that the initial entry by the police into his home "under the guise
of being a potential buyer . . . [constituted] an illegal subterfuge,"
which invalidated the basis for the search warrant.2 12 The trial
court denied the motion.2 13
The court of appeals found that placing the house on the mar-
ket extended a general invitation to the public to view the interior
of the home, and, "the officers did not violate any reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy [if their] actions while inside the home did
not exceed what one would expect of a prospective purchaser."2 14
Applying this standard, the court found the officers in this case
204. See id. at 224, 700 S.E.2d at 484.
205. Id. at 230, 700 S.E.2d at 486-87.
206. 57 Va. App. 254, 257, 701 S.E.2d 81, 82 (2010).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 257-58, 701 S.E.2d at 83.
211. Id. at 258, 701 S.E.2d at 83.
212. Id. at 259-60, 701 S.E.2d at 83-84.
213. See id.
214. Id. at 263, 701 S.E.2d at 85-86.
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acted reasonably, and the trial court correctly denied the sup-
pression motion.2 1 5
In Commonwealth v. Smith, the Supreme Court of Virginia ad-
dressed the basis of knowledge required to justify a frisk. 216 Fol-
lowing the denial of his motion to suppress by the trial court,
Smith entered a conditional guilty plea for possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon.217 Although the Court of Appeals of Virginia
reversed the conviction, ruling the trial court erred in denying the
suppression motion, the supreme court reversed the ruling of the
court of appeals, and reinstated the trial court's judgment. "'
Police officers stopped a car for a broken tail light and asked
for identification from the driver and the passenger, Smith.21 9 A
police database, available by computer in the police car, alerted
the officers that Smith was "probably armed and a narcotics sell-
er/user."220 Smith stepped out of the car upon request and stated
that he had no weapons or drugs on him.2 2 1 After an officer ad-
vised Smith the officer needed to pat Smith down for weapons,
Smith refused the search.2 2 2 While conducting the pat down, the
officer felt and seized a gun from Smith's pocket.22 3
The supreme court noted that the issue was whether infor-
mation known to the officer making the entry into the police da-
tabase as well as the personal knowledge of the officers on the
scene provided reasonable suspicion for the frisk.2 24 The officers
knew Smith was a convicted felon, and his criminal history in-
cluded an arrest eleven months prior for possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon and an arrest for possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute, an offense "closely associated with fire-
arms."225 The court concluded "the knowledge of Smith's specific
criminal history involving weapons and narcotics, which was im-
215. Id., 701 S.E.2d at 86.
216. 281 Va. 582, 586, 709 S.E.2d 139, 140 (2011).
217. See id. at 586-87, 709 S.E.2d at 140-41.
218. Id. at 587, 596, 709 S.E.2d at 141, 146.
219. Id. at 586, 709 S.E.2d at 140.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 592, 709 S.E.2d at 143.
225. Id. at 592-93, 709 S.E.2d at 143-44.
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puted to the officers based upon the [police database] system jus-
tified the frisk."2 2 6
At issue in Armstead v. Commonwealth was the validity of a
search of the defendant's vehicle.22 7 A police officer arrested the
defendant for providing false information during a traffic stop af-
ter he twice gave misleading information about his identification
and the status of his driver's license. 2 28 To determine the defend-
ant's identity, the officer proceeded to search the car.22 9 In plain
view the officer saw the remains of a marijuana cigar in the ash-
tray and two plastic bags containing crack cocaine in the center
console.2 30 Relying on Arizona v. Gant, the defendant contended
the trial court erred in not suppressing the drugs. The Court of
Appeals of Virginia disagreed.2 3 ' In Gant, the Supreme Court of
the United States rejected a broad right to make a suspicionless
search of a vehicle following the arrest of an occupant of the vehi-
cle.2 32 Instead, a search is permitted, first, if the person is within
reach of the passenger compartment and might try to obtain a
weapon, or second, if it is "reasonable to believe evidence relevant
to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle."2 3 3 The court
of appeals found the officer reasonably believed the car might
contain evidence relevant to the crime of providing false identify-
ing information to a police officer, namely, "Armstead's true iden-
tity and his driving status."2 3 4
The court also rejected the defendant's complaint that "the ar-
rest was pretextual and a mere ruse to search the vehicle" for the
presence of illegal drugs.2 3 5 Under settled Fourth Amendment
principles, the subjective motivation of the officer is irrelevant, so
long as the officer actually has probable cause to arrest.2 3 6 Be-
cause the officer had probable cause to arrest Armstead for
226. Id. at 596, 709 S.E.2d at 146.
227. 56 Va. App. 569, 574-76, 695 S.E.2d 561, 563-64 (2010).
228. Id. at 573, 695 S.E.2d at 562-63.
229. Id. at 574, 695 S.E.2d at 563.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 575-76, 695 S.E.2d at 564 (citing 556 U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)).
232. See 556 U.S. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 1723-24.
233. Id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (quoting Thorton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632
(2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
234. Armstead, 56 Va. App. at 577, 695 S.E.2d at 565.
235. Id. at 574, 579, 695 S.E.2d at 563, 566.
236. Id. at 578-79, 695 S.E.2d at 565.
82 [Vol. 46:59
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
providing false identity information to him, the officer reasonably
searched the car on the basis that it could contain evidence of
that crime.2 37
C. Standing
The principal issue in Atkins v. Commonwealth was whether
the defendant had standing to challenge an inventory search of
the car in which he was a passenger.2 3 8 Two officers stopped the
car for a burned out license plate light.23 9 Shortly after the stop,
the driver of the vehicle fled on foot.240 When the defendant pas-
senger dropped a bottle containing heroin, the officers arrested
him.24 1 Given the flight of the driver and the defendant's arrest,
the police officers proceeded to conduct an inventory search and
recovered two firearms.2 4 2 When the defendant challenged the
search, the prosecution responded by asserting that the defend-
ant, a passenger, lacked standing to contest the search.2 4 3 The
Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded that a defendant only has
standing when he "objectively ha[s] a reasonable expectation of
privacy at the time and place of the disputed search."24 4 A totality
of the circumstances test determines whether this expectation ex-
ists.245
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals found Rakas v. Il-
linois controlling. 246 In Rakas, the Supreme Court concluded a
passenger lacked standing to challenge the search of a locked
glove compartment and the area underneath the front passenger
seat.2 47 The court of appeals found Brendlin v. California, cited by
the defendant, inapposite.2 4 8 In Brendlin, the Supreme Court held
that a passenger in a car only has standing to challenge the stop
237. Id. at 579, 695 S.E.2d at 566.
238. 57 Va. App. 2, 10, 698 S.E.2d 249, 253 (2010).
239. Id. at 8, 698 S.E.2d at 252.
240. Id. at 9, 698 S.E.2d at 252.
241. Id., 698 S.E.2d at 253.
242. Id. at 9-10, 698 S.E.2d at 253.
243. Id. at 10, 698 S.E.2d at 253.
244. Id. at 12, 698 S.E.2d at 254 (quoting McCoy v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 309,
311, 343 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
245. Id. at 13, 698 S.E.2d at 254.
246. Id. at 11, 698 S.E.2d at 253 (citing 439 U.S. 128 (1978)).
247. 439 U.S. at 130, 148.
248. Atkins, 57 Va. App. at 12, 698 S.E.2d at 254.
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of the car, not a search of the vehicle.2 4 9 Therefore, the Court of
Appeals of Virginia concluded that the defendant, who carried the
burden of establishing standing to challenge the search, failed to
meet that burden.2 5 0 The court observed that the defendant
made no showing that he had a possessory interest in the car, that
he had the right to exclude others from the vehicle, that he had ex-
hibited a subjective expectation that the vehicle and its contents
would remain free from governmental invasion, that he exercised
control over the vehicle, or that appellant took any precautions to
maintain his privacy. 251
In sum, standing to challenge the search of a vehicle requires
more than "simply being a legitimate passenger."2 5 2
IV. SPECIFIC CRIMES
A. Abduction
In Burton v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held the evidence was insufficient to prove the necessary element
of intent to deprive the victim of her personal liberty and, accord-
ingly, reversed the abduction conviction.2 5 3 In mid-afternoon at a
shopping mall parking lot, the defendant, dressed in a mechanic's
uniform, knocked on the window of the victim's car and told her
the car appeared to be leaking brake fluid.25 4 In fact, the victim
recently had work done on the car's brakes and was not satisfied
with the work.2 5 5 The defendant looked under the hood of the car
and then directed the victim to lie across the front seats of the
car.256 The victim complied, but after several minutes, she felt un-
comfortable, exited the car, "and saw [the defendant] squatting
down near the rear wheel with his hand inside his unzipped
pants."5 The victim told the defendant she wanted to leave.2 58
249. See 551 U.S. 249, 255, 257 (2007).
250. Atkins, 57 Va. App. at 13-14, 698 S.E.2d at 254-55.
251. Id. at 14, 698 S.E.2d at 255.
252. Id.
253. 281 Va. 622, 627-29, 708 S.E.2d 892, 895-96 (2011).
254. Id. at 625, 708 S.E.2d at 893.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id., 708 S.E.2d at 894.
258. Id.
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While the defendant initially blocked the victim from leaving, he
moved when she repeated her need to leave.2 59
The supreme court held "the evidence fail[ed] to prove that [the
defendant] detained the victim with the intent to deprive her of
her personal liberty."2 60 The court concluded the defendant in-
tended to receive sexual gratification by having the victim lie
across the front seat of her car."e The fact that the defendant did
not persist in detaining the victim after she repeated her need to
leave supported the conclusion that the defendant lacked the req-
uisite intent.2 62 Therefore, the court held that "[e]ven though [the
victim] was deceived into remaining briefly in a certain location
due to Burton's ruse, under the facts before us, we cannot say
that there was evidence that Burton had the intent to deprive
[the victim] of her personal liberty."2 63
B. Animal Cruelty
The defendant in Sullivan v. Commonwealth challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence for her conviction of animal cruelty.2 6 4
Virginia Code section 3.2-6570(A) makes it a Class 1 misdemean-
or to "deprivef any animal of necessary food, drink, shelter or
emergency veterinary treatment."26 5 The Virginia Code defines
emergency veterinary treatment as "veterinary treatment to sta-
bilize a life-threatening condition, alleviate suffering, prevent fur-
ther disease transmission, or prevent further disease progres-
sion."2 66 In Sullivan, an animal control officer responded to a
telephone report and discovered an emaciated, non-responsive,
weak horse, unable to lift its head to a bucket to drink.26 7 Despite
subsequent medical treatment, the horse died.26 8
259. Id.
260. Id. at 627-28, 708 S.E.2d at 895.
261. Id. at 628, 708 S.E.2d at 895.
262. Id. at 628-29, 708 S.E.2d at 895.
263. Id. at 629, 708 S.E.2d at 896.
264. 280 Va. 672, 673, 701 S.E.2d 61, 62 (2010).
265. VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6570(A)(ii), (vi) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
266. Id. § 3.2-6500 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
267. 280 Va. at 674-75, 701 S.E.2d at 62-63.
268. Id. at 675, 701 S.E.2d at 63.
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At trial, expert testimony established the horse's condition de-
veloped over a period of weeks, and the horse suffered from a va-
riety of problems, including parasites that prevented the horse
from obtaining sufficient nutrition.2 69 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia found this evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for de-
priving an animal of emergency veterinary care, noting the fact-
finder was not required to accept the defendant's "incredible" ac-
count that she never noticed the horse's deterioration until she
found it lying down.27 0
C. Child Endangerment
In Carosi v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia af-
firmed the defendant's convictions for three counts of child en-
dangerment, pursuant to Virginia Code section 40.1-103(A) be-
cause she allowed illegal drugs to be kept in her home in a place
accessible to her three children. 271
Pursuant to a search warrant, a state police agent searched the
Stafford County home Angela Carosi shared with her three chil-
dren and Cavell Thomas, "the father of two of the children."2 7 2
Another jurisdiction held Thomas in custody for drug charges
when the search occurred.2 7 3 In an unlocked wardrobe in the mas-
ter bedroom shared by Carosi and Thomas, the agent found mari-
juana, smoking devices, a digital scale with powder residue, and
plastic bags.2 74 The agent also discovered prescription bottles con-
taining oxycodone and ecstasy in an unlocked safe in the ward-
robe.2 75 The agent noticed the location of all the drugs was "within
the reach of a small child."2 7 6 Carosi told the agent she kept cloth-
ing in the wardrobe but denied any knowledge of the drugs.2 77
269. Id.
270. Id. at 677, 701 S.E.2d at 64.
271. 280 Va. 545, 549, 557, 701 S.E.2d 441, 444, 447-48 (2010) (citing VA. CODE ANN. §
40.1-103(A) (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
272. Id. at 548, 701 S.E.2d at 442-43.
273. Id., 701 S.E.2d at 443.
274. Id. at 549, 701 S.E.2d at 443.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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At trial, Carosi argued the Commonwealth failed to produce ev-
idence sufficient to convict her of child endangerment because no
evidence showed the children knew the contraband was in the
house or actually had accessed it.2 78 Thomas testified on Carosi's
behalf and claimed he hid the drugs in the wardrobe. 7' During
her testimony, Carosi admitted her children occasionally went
into her bedroom.2 8 0 The supreme court, however, held the jury
reasonably could have found Carosi "was . . . aware of the pres-
ence and character of the drugs."2 8 1
The supreme court held that showing the defendant acted in a
criminally negligent manner satisfied the mens rea requirement
for child endangerment.2 8 2 The court concluded that, depending
on the facts of a specific case, "rearing children in a home where
illegal drugs are readily accessible may constitute" child endan-
germent.2 8 3 Thus, the jury properly determined the issue, and
their conclusion "was [not] plainly wrong or without [evidentiary]
support."2 8 4
In Wood v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia af-
firmed convictions for felony child neglect resulting from the de-
fendant driving her two preschool-aged children while intoxicated
with alcohol and the sleep-inducing drug Ambien.2 85 A shopper in
a parking lot observed the defendant sitting in her car and behav-
ing oddly with two small children seated in child safety seats in
the back seat.2 86 Concerned, the shopper called the police and re-
ported the matter.2 87 Wood drove her car a short distance in the
parking lot before police officers stopped her.2 8 8 Although she told
police she only drank a glass of wine at lunch and took Paxil, the
278. Id. at 550, 701 S.E.2d at 443.
279. Id., 701 S.E.2d at 444.
280. Id. at 551, 701 S.E.2d at 444.
281. Id. at 555, 701 S.E.2d at 446.
282. Id. at 553, 701 S.E.2d at 445.
283. Id. at 557, 701 S.E.2d at 447-48.
284. Id.
285. 57 Va. App. 286, 291-93, 701 S.E.2d 810, 812-13 (2010).
286. Id. at 292, 701 S.E.2d at 812.
287. Id., 701 S.E.2d at 813.
288. See id.
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defendant showed signs of extreme intoxication and responded
belligerently to the police officers.2 8 9
At trial, the Commonwealth introduced expert testimony that
Wood's blood alcohol level, which measured .19 when tested sev-
eral hours after the incident, would have measured between .22
and .26 when she drove. 290 Based on the level of the hypnotic drug
Ambien in Wood's blood, the expert further testified that at the
time of the driving, Wood should have been sleeping.21 The ex-
pert also opined there is "an addictive effect" when two central
nervous system depressants like alcohol and Ambien are both
consumed.2 92
The court of appeals held the evidence established the requisite
criminal negligence because Wood, "while in a semi-conscious
state," took her children from the safety of their home and drove
them to a parking lot with its attendant dangers.2 9 3 The court
noted that the defendant's "bizarre behavior" demonstrated her
inability to "protect and supervise" her children, and her belliger-
ence indicated a "lack of control and judgment."2 9 4 The court also
"underscore[d]" that "[Wood's] high level of intoxication . . . alone
justifie[d] a finding of [criminal negligence]."2 95
D. Child Pornography
In Chapman v. Commonwealth, after the police discovered
twenty child pornography images cached on the defendant's com-
puter, the defendant was charged with one count of possession of
child pornography and nine counts of possession of child pornog-
raphy, second or subsequent offense.2 96 The defendant challenged
"four of the ten charges," arguing that the language of the statute
required the court to strike them.2 97 In making his argument that
289. Id. at 292-93, 701 S.E.2d at 813.
290. Id. at 293-94, 701 S.E.2d at 813.
291. Id. at 294, 701 S.E.2d at 814.
292. Id. at 295, 701 S.E.2d at 814.
293. Id. at 300-01, 701 S.E.2d at 816-17.
294. Id. at 300, 701 S.E.2d at 816.
295. Id. at 301, 701 S.E.2d at 817 (emphasis added).
296. 56 Va. App. 725, 728-29, 697 S.E.2d 20, 22 (2010).
297. Id. at 729, 697 S.E.2d at 23 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-3741.1(A) (Repl. Vol.
2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
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each charge of child pornography required three images, the de-
fendant relied on the statute's definition of "sexually explicit vis-
ual material," and, more specifically, on an amendment to the
statute italicized below.298 The Virginia Code provides "that sex-
ually explicit visual material" is
a picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, digi-
tal image, including such material stored in a computer's temporary
Internet cache when three or more images or streaming videos are
present, or similar visual representation which depicts sexual besti-
ality, a lewd exhibition of nudity . . . or sexual excitement, sexual
conduct or sadomasochistic abuse . . . or a book, magazine or pam-
phlet which contains such a visual representation.299
The Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected this argument. The
court observed that the paramount purpose of the statute forbid-
ding the possession of child pornography "was to protect children
from the harm they suffer when they are induced to" pose for
sexually explicit materials.3 00 The court found it unlikely that in
amending the statute the General Assembly intended to reduce
the culpability of persons in possession of child pornography.3 0 1
The proper reading of Virginia Code section 18.2-374.1(A) is that
three images constitute a threshold for convictions of child por-
nography "based on materials found in a defendant's temporary
Internet cache."30 2 After satisfying this initial threshold, "the
permissible unit of prosecution for possession of child pornogra-
phy . .. corresponds to the number of individual items of sexually
explicit visual material."o
E. Driving Under the Influence
To be convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol, the
defendant must "operate" a motor vehicle.3 04 In Nelson v. Corn-
298. Id. at 732, 697 S.E.2d at 23-24 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1(A) (Repl. Vol.
2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
299. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011) (emphasis
added).
300. Chapman, 56 Va. App. at 733, 697 S.E.2d at 24 (quoting Freeman v. Common-
wealth, 223 Va. 301, 309, 288 S.E.2d 461, 465 (1982)) (internal quotations marks omitted).
301. Id., 697 S.E.2d at 25.
302. Id. at 734, 697 S.E.2d at 25.
303. Id. (quoting Mason v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 39, 48, 636 S.E.2d 480, 484
(2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
304. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
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monwealth, before falling asleep, the defendant placed the key in
the ignition to the "accessory" position.3 0 5 When the police officer
approached the car, he noticed the radio was turned on and the
"gearshift lever was in the 'park' position," but the engine was not
running.3 06 The Supreme Court of Virginia held that to "operate"
the vehicle, the defendant must "engag[e] the machinery of the
vehicle which alone, or in sequence, will activate the motive pow-
er of the vehicle."30 7 Although the act of turning the key did not
activate the motive power of the vehicle, it constituted "'an action
taken 'in sequence' up to the point of activation, making [the de-
fendant] the operator of the vehicle within the meaning of Code §
18.2-266."308
In Rix v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia ap-
plied the holding in Nelson to a situation where the defendant,
originally a front seat passenger, switched places with the driver
after the police stopped the vehicle.3 09 Upon approaching the ve-
hicle, the police observed the key in the ignition and the engine
running.3 1 0 The defendant, however, was also drunk when she
switched places with the driver. 3 1 1 Applying its holding in Nelson,
the court found the defendant guilty of driving under the influ-
ence because she had "actual physical control of a fully operation-
al motor vehicle on a highway, with its ignition key in the 'on' po-
sition and its engine running."3 12 Therefore, she qualified as the
"operator" of the motor vehicle.3 13
A defendant's conviction for driving under the influence may
also depend on the admissibility of blood alcohol test results. In
Roseborough v. Commonwealth, the admissibility of the defend-
ant's blood test results hinged on the validity of his arrest. 3 14 Dis-
305. 281 Va. 212, 214, 707 S.E.2d 815, 816 (2011).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 216, 707 S.E.2d at 817 (quoting Stevenson v. City of Falls Church, 243 Va.
434, 438, 416 S.E.2d 435, 438 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
308. Id. at 219, 707 S.E.2d at 818 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (Repl. Vol. 2009 &
Cum. Supp. 2011)).
309. 282 Va. 1, 3, S.E.2d _, (2011) (citing Nelson, 281 Va. at 219, 707 S.E.2d
at 818).
310. Id. at 1, S.E.2d at
311. Id. at 1-2, S.E.2d at
312. Id. at 3, - S.E.2d at - (citing Nelson, 281 Va. at 219, 707 S.E.2d at 818).
313. Id.
314. 281 Va. 233, 238, 704 S.E.2d 414, 416 (2011).
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patch sent the police officers to a gated apartment complex in Al-
exandria, where, upon arrival, they found a single-vehicle acci-
dent on one of the private roads.3 1 5 The police arrested the de-
fendant and administered a breath test, which revealed a blood
alcohol content that exceeded the legal limit.31 6 The Supreme
Court of Virginia focused its analysis on the implied consent stat-
ute that allows police to take breath samples of persons arrested
for driving under the influence.3 1 7 The arrest, of course, must still
be a valid one.31 8
Although an officer can arrest for a misdemeanor that occurred
in his presence, the accident had not occurred in the officer's
presence.3 1 9 The Virginia Code also permits an officer to validly
arrest a suspect "without a warrant, at the scene of an accident
involving a motor vehicle on any of the highways of the Com-
monwealth, on reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has
been committed by such person."3 20 Additionally, the Virginia
Code allows warrantless arrests for "such accident[s]" if the of-
ficer arrests the person within three hours of the accident and
makes the arrest based on probable cause that the driver was
driving while intoxicated.3 2 ' The Supreme Court of Virginia con-
cluded that the term "such accident" refers to "highways of the
Commonwealth."32 2 Therefore, the legislature "confine[d] an of-
ficer's authority to make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor
in cases of this kind to situations in which there has been a ve-
hicular accident on the highways of the Commonwealth."3 2 3 The
accident took place on a private road that was not "open to the
use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel."32 4 Because none
of the exceptions applied, the arrest was not valid.3 25 Without a
315. Id. at 235-36, 704 S.E.2d at 415.
316. Id. at 236, 704 S.E.2d at 415.
317. Id. at 236-37, 704 S.E.2d at 416 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.2(A)-(B) (Repl.
Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
318. See id. at 238, 704 S.E.2d at 416.
319. Id. at 239, 704 S.E.2d at 417.
320. Id. at 238, 704 S.E.2d at 416-17 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81 (Cum. Supp.
2011)).
321. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
322. Id. at 238-39, 704 S.E.2d at 417.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 239, 704 S.E.2d at 417 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-100 (Supp. 2011)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
325. Id.
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valid arrest, "the implied consent law did not apply and its provi-
sions permitting the certificate of analysis to be admitted into ev-
idence were not triggered."3 2 6
Finally, the supreme court rejected the rationale adopted by
the court of appeals-that the defendant voluntarily took the so-
briety test at the police station.3 2 7 Voluntariness, the supreme
court concluded, was irrelevant to the issue of admitting the cer-
tificate into evidence.3 2 8 Admissibility, the court found, "depended
entirely upon the applicability of the implied consent law."32 9
In Young v. Commonwealth, the applicability of the implied
consent law depended on the timing of the defendant's arrest.3 30
Although the trooper informed the defendant that he was under
arrest, the trooper never physically arrested the defendant.3 3 In
stead, because an accident left the defendant bleeding from the
head, emergency workers took him to the hospital. 332 Test results
showed an elevated blood alcohol level at the time of the acci-
dent.3 3 3 Even though the defendant went to the hospital and was
not subjected to a traditional arrest, the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia concluded that several statutes modified the standard ar-
rest analysis. 334 Specifically, the court found that Virginia Code
section 19.2-73(B) authorizes an officer "to issue a summons 'in
lieu of securing a warrant' for a suspected drunk driver who has
been taken to a medical facility."335 The officer relied on this stat-
ute.3 ' The court of appeals concluded the trooper arrested the de-
fendant by operation of this statute, and the summons released
the defendant from arrest. 3 3 7
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. 57 Va. App. 731, 733, 706 S.E.2d 53, 54 (2011), petition for cert. filed, (Va. Mar. 28,
2011) (No. 110587).
331. See id. at 734, 706 S.E.2d at 55.
332. Id. at 733-34, 706 S.E.2d at 54-55.
333. See id. at 734 & n.2, 706 S.E.2d at 55 & n.2.
334. Id. at 737-39, 706 S.E.2d at 56-57.
335. Id. at 737-38, 706 S.E.2d at 56-57 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-73(B) (Cum.
Supp. 2011)).
336. Id. at 734, 739, 706 S.E.2d at 55, 57.
337. Id. at 734-40, 706 S.E.2d at 57.
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Courts also face the issue of causation when dealing with driv-
ing under the influence. In Davis v. Commonwealth, a jury con-
victed Michael Rashe Davis of vehicular aggravated involuntary
manslaughter in connection with the death of his cousin, a pedes-
trian who Davis struck and killed him with his car.3 38 The Court
of Appeals of Virginia rejected Davis's challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence on causation and criminal negligence and af-
firmed his conviction.3 39 The summons served as a statutory mak-
er confirming Young's ongoing submission to the officer's authori-
ty.
After consuming alcohol at a birthday party, an intoxicated
Davis drove his car with his female cousin as the front seat pas-
senger.3 4 0 As Davis drove on an unlit road in town, he sent text
messages using his cellular telephone.3 4 1 The passenger observed
an object in the road and warned Davis.3 4 2 Davis took no evasive
action, ran over Ronald White, and crashed the car into a ditch.34 3
A blood alcohol test revealed an alcohol level of .15 .344At trial, an
expert testified that Davis's alcohol level when driving was .19 to
.2 1.345
On appeal, Davis argued the Commonwealth failed to prove his
intoxicated driving caused the death because "sending text mes-
sages, rather than his driving under the influence of alcohol,
caused him to strike and kill [the victim]."346 The court of appeals,
however, found that the text messaging did not constitute an in-
The issuance of the summons under Code § 19.2-73(B), releasing Young from
arrest, served as a statutory marker confirming Young's ongoing submission
to the arresting officer's authority. By signing the summons, Young acknowl-
edged his continuing submission to the arrest and his promise to appear in
court as a condition for being released from arrest.
Id. at 740, 706 S.E.2d at 57-58 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-73(B) (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
338. 57 Va. App. 446, 451-52, 703 S.E.2d 259, 261-62 (2011).
339. Id. at 452, 464-65, 703 S.E.2d at 262, 268. In Davis, the court of appeals also ad-
dressed and rejected a double jeopardy claim and a claim under Virginia Code section
19.2-294, based on the defendant's conviction of driving under the influence in the general
district court and his conviction of the felony manslaughter offense in circuit court. Id. at
454-57, 703 S.E.2d at 263-64 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294 (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
340. Id. at 452, 703 S.E.2d at 262.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 453, 703 S.E.2d at 262.
345. Id. at 453-54, 703 S.E.2d at 262-63.
346. Id. at 462, 464, 703 S.E.2d at 267.
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tervening cause of the incident.' The court held that Davis's act
of sending text messages "did not break the chain of events initi-
ated by his driving while intoxicated. It merely aggravated his
recklessness."3 4 8 The court also rejected Davis's claim that the
Commonwealth had not proven criminal negligence because the
high blood alcohol level alone established criminal negligence.34 9
In addition, the court of appeals noted other facts that supported
a finding of criminal negligence, including Davis "sending text
messages on a dark, rainy night," and his failure "to take any
evasive action" when warned of something in the road."o
F. Drugs
In Cordon v. Commonwealth, a divided Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia reversed a conviction for possession of cocaine.3' In Sep-
tember 2007, a burglary occurred at the home owned by Cordon's
uncle.3 52 During the investigation of that crime, Cordon told the
police his uncle, the owner of the house, was away, and Cordon
lived there.3 5 3 At that time he showed the officers a room he re-
ferred to as "his" room and told the police "nothing was missing"
from that room.35 4 However, he later told investigators he noticed
a lockbox missing from under "his bed."35 5 On November 18, 2007,
during the burglary investigation, Detective Baer of the Hampton
Police Department gave Cordon a business card."
On November 20, 2007, when police officers executed a search
warrant at the home, only the uncle was at the home.3 5 7 In the
bedroom Cordon previously identified as "his," the officers found a
347. Id. at 462-63, 703 S.E.2d at 267. The court of appeals also noted Davis's own tes-
timony that when the passenger alerted him he put the cell phone down, watched the
road, and took evasive action contradicted his contention that using the cell phone caused
the incident. Id. at 462, 703 S.E.2d at 267.
348. Id. at 463, 703 S.E.2d at 267.
349. Id. at 464, 703 S.E.2d at 267-68.
350. Id., 703 S.E.2d at 268.
351. 280 Va. 691, 693, 696-97, 701 S.E.2d 803, 804, 806 (2010) (4-3 decision).
352. Id. at 693, 701 S.E.2d at 804-05.
353. Id., 701 S.E.2d at 805.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id., 701 S.E.2d at 804-05.
357. Id., 701 S.E.2d at 804.
94 [Vol. 46:59
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
cooler containing cocaine, baggies, and drug paraphernalia.3 5 8 The
officers also found checks and papers bearing Cordon's name, a
scale, and other drug-related items, as well as Detective Baer's
business card in a nightstand drawer in the room.3 5 9 A week later,
after officers told Cordon of the discovery of contraband, Cordon
denied living at his uncle's home and terminated the interview."o
The circuit court convicted Cordon of possession of cocaine. The
court of appeals affirmed his conviction."'
In reversing the judgment, the Supreme Court of Virginia not-
ed Cordon's absence from the house or bedroom when the police
discovered the cooler of cocaine, the complete lack of other physi-
cal evidence to link Cordon to the cooler or contraband, and that
two days had passed since Cordon "was known to be" at the
house.362 Although he stated during the investigation that the
bedroom was his, he listed his address in Newport News, and the
police found the drugs in a cooler, an easily portable item.36 3 The
supreme court concluded that Cordon's denial that he lived in the
home when told the police found drugs there "gave rise to an in-
ference that he was lying to conceal his guilt . . . [but] that infer-
ence along with the remaining evidence [fell] short of . .. suffi-
cient evidence . .. to support the conviction."36 4
In Williams v. Commonwealth, an appeal from a conviction for
possessing a controlled drug without a valid prescription, the
Court of Appeals of Virginia addressed the question of whether
limiting language in a statute constitutes a negative element of
the offense or an affirmative statutory defense. 365
Christopher James Williams was charged with possession of a
controlled substance, pills containing oxycodone and acetamino-
phen, without a valid prescription, in violation of Virginia Code
section 18.2-250.366 Prior to trial, Williams moved to dismiss the
charge on the ground that Virginia Code section 18.2-263 was un-
358. Id., 701 S.E.2d at 804-05.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 694, 701 S.E.2d at 805.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 696, 701 S.E.2d at 806.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. 57 Va. App. 341, 348, 702 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2010).
366. Id. at 345, 702 S.E.2d at 262 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-250 (Repl. Vol. 2009 &
Cum. Supp. 2011)).
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constitutional, but the trial court denied the motion.36 At trial,
the Commonwealth relied on Virginia Code section 18.2-263 and
did not introduce evidence that Williams did not obtain a valid
prescription for the drugs.3 68
Williams argued on appeal, as he did at trial, that Virginia
Code section 18.2-263 violates the due process clauses of the state
and federal constitutions because it shifts the burden to the de-
fendant to prove his innocence. 3 69 The court of appeals held that
when determining if specific limiting language in a statute is an
element or an affirmative defense, "a court should look both to
the intent of the statute as a whole and the ability of the respec-
tive parties to assert the existence or absence of the underlying
facts sustaining the applicability of the limitation."s 0
The court of appeals found the General Assembly intended for
the drug laws to "rigorously limit" possession of the drugs listed
in Schedules I, II, and III.371 The court also found the "'valid pre-
scription' exemption of Code § 18.2-250 relates to a fact that
would be solely within the knowledge of the accused."37 2 The court
found "the exception language in Code § 18.2-250 [does] not [con-
stitute] an element of the offense, but rather an affirmative de-
367. Id. at 345-46, 702 S.E.2d at 262 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-263 (Repl. Vol. 2009
& Cum. Supp. 2011)). Virginia Code section 18.2-250(A) provides in pertinent part:
It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a con-
trolled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursu-
ant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the
course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by the
Drug Control Act . ...
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-250(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011). Virginia Code section
18.2-263 provides in pertinent part:
In any complaint, information, or indictment, and in any action or proceeding
brought for the enforcement of any provision of this article or of the Drug
Control Act it shall not be necessary to negative any exception, excuse,
proviso, or exemption contained in this article or in the Drug Control Act, and
the burden of proof of any such exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption shall
be upon the defendant.
Id. § 18.2-263 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
368. Williams, 57 Va. App. at 346, 702 S.E.2d at 262 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-263
(Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
369. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-263 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011)). Wil-
liams also challenged the statute on vagueness grounds, but the court of appeals found
that Williams waived that argument. Id. at 346-47, 702 S.E.2d at 262-63.
370. Id. at 349, 702 S.E.2d at 264 (quoting Mayhew v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App.
484, 490, 458 S.E.2d 305, 307-08 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
371. Id. at 351, 702 S.E.2d at 264.
372. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-250 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
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fense," which the defendant must support with evidence.' The
court concluded that due process permits requiring a defendant to
produce evidence to contest an inferred fact, so Williams's argu-
ment that Virginia Code section 18.2-263 violated his due process
rights failed.317
G. Failure To Reregister as a Sex Offender
Virginia law makes it a crime to "knowingly" fail to reregister
as a sex offender. 7' However, the use of the word "knowingly"
does not necessarily require that the defendant possess the specif-
ic intent not to register. The defendant in Marshall v. Common-
wealth testified he failed to reregister because he accidentally be-
came stranded in California when he accompanied his uncle on a
trip.3 76 He contended he did not act with a "bad purpose" or "spe-
cific intent" and, therefore, did not meet the requirement of
"knowingly" failing to register.3 77 In rejecting this argument, the
Court of Appeals of Virginia first noted the absence of language
denoting specific intent. 7' Generally speaking, the court ob-
served, "knowing" and "knowingly" "do not encompass specific in-
tent or purpose to accomplish a result."37 ' The court of appeals
concluded that its construction of the term "knowingly" was con-
sistent with the express purpose of the statute, which is "to assist
the efforts of law-enforcement agencies and others to protect their
communities and families from repeat offenders."38 0 Requiring
specific intent would thwart this purpose because a defendant
could escape conviction by simply forgetting to register.38 1 The
court finally noted that every federal circuit that considered such
373. Id. at 354, 702 S.E.2d at 266 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-250 (Repl. Vol. 2009 &
Cum. Supp. 2011)).
374. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-263 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
375. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-472.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2011).
376. 58 Va. App. 210, 213, 708 S.E.2d 253, 254 (2011), petition for cert. filed, (Va. June
2, 2010) (No. 111012).
377. Id. at 214, 708 S.E.2d at 255.
378. Id. at 215-16, 708 S.E.2d at 256.
379. Id. at 217, 708 S.E.2d at 256.
380. Id. at 217-18, 708 S.E.2d at 256-57 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-900 (Repl. Vol.
2006 & Cum. Supp. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
381. Id. at 218, 708 S.E.2d at 257.
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an argument in the context of a nearly identical statute rejected
the requirement of specific intent.38 2
H. Firearm Offenses
The question of specific intent also arises in the context of fire-
arm offenses. In Ellis v. Commonwealth, Cordero Ellis challenged
his conviction for unlawfully discharging a firearm at or against
an occupied building.3 8 3 The evidence showed Ellis shot at a per-
son known as "D.A.," but another man and his minor nephew,
who just left an occupied convenience store, were in the line of
fire.3 84 A bullet actually entered the occupied convenience store.38 5
An aerial photograph admitted at trial demonstrated that Ellis
stood "only a short distance from the convenience store when he
fired at 'D.A.,"' and also showed other buildings located in close
proximity to the shooting.38 6 Other testimony established the
neighborhood included a mix of business and residential build-
ings.387
The Supreme Court of Virginia determined Virginia Code sec-
tion 18.2-279, which prohibits the malicious or unlawful shooting
at an occupied building, does not require proof "that the [shooter]
had the specific intent to shoot at or against a particular build-
ing."38 8 The court held the evidence "need only show that a de-
fendant who unlawfully discharges a firearm knew or should
have known that an occupied building or buildings were in his
line of fire."3 89 The supreme court held it was reasonable to infer
Ellis knew the neighborhood and knew the convenience store was
occupied and open for business at the time he fired the gun.3 90
Convictions for firearm offenses sometimes hinge on the court's
definition of a "firearm." In Startin v. Commonwealth, Duane
382. Id. at 218-19, 708 S.E.2d at 257.
383. 281 Va. 499, 501-02, 706 S.E.2d 849, 849-50 (2011). The grand jury also indicted
Ellis for maliciously discharging a firearm at an occupied building, but the trial court only
found Ellis guilty of the lesser included charge. Id.
384. Id. at 502, 706 S.E.2d at 850.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 507, 706 S.E.2d at 853.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 506, 706 S.E.2d at 852 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-279 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
389. Id.
390. Id. at 507, 706 S.E.2d at 853.
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Elmer Startin used a "John Wayne Replica" .45 caliber handgun
to rob pharmacies.9 ' The "commemorative replica" appeared to be
a real firearm but, in fact, lacked "a firing pin or other mechani-
cal device necessary to fire a projectile."3 9 2 Startin appealed his
convictions for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony in
violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-53.1, and the Supreme
Court of Virginia affirmed his conviction."
The supreme court stated many statutes defined the term
"firearm" differently and noted Virginia Code section 18.2-308.2,
which criminalizes possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
narrowly construes the definition of a firearm.3 9 4 The court held
the definition of firearm under Virginia Code section 18.2-53.1
''warrants a 'broad construction' and includes any instrument
that 'gives the appearance of being a firearm.'3 95 Thus, while the
replica used by Startin would not support a conviction of posses-
sion of a firearm by a convicted felon, it was sufficient to sustain a
conviction for use of a firearm in the commission of robbery.3 96
A court may convict a defendant for use of a firearm even if he
never shows the weapon. In Courtney v. Commonwealth, the de-
fendant approached the victim when she drove into her drive-
way.3 97 Courtney told the victim he had a gun and would shoot
her; however, the victim did not see the gun or the item Courtney
held under his shirt.39 8 The victim pressed the horn of her vehicle,
and Courtney grabbed the victim's two purses and cellular tele-
phone and fled in a car driven by another. 39 9 The police appre-
hended Courtney about five minutes later at a gasoline station
three miles from the scene of the crime. 4 00 At the gas station, the
police found the victim's phone in the restroom and discovered
391. 281 Va. 374, 376-77, 706 S.E.2d 873, 875-76 (2011).
392. Id. at 377, 706 S.E.2d at 876.
393. Id. at 378, 383, 706 S.E.2d at 876, 879 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-53.1 (Repl.
Vol. 2009)).
394. Id. at 381, 706 S.E.2d at 878 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2 (Cum. Supp.
2011)).
395. Id. at 382, 706 S.E.2d at 878 (quoting Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573,
582, 562 S.E.2d 139, 144 (2002)).
396. Id.
397. 281 Va. 363, 365, 706 S.E.2d 344, 345 (2011).
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
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her purses in the street.4 0 1 From the car in which Courtney was
riding, officers recovered a cap gun, which was "obviously, a toy
gun."402
The supreme court stated that since the victim never saw the
recovered toy gun, the issue in the case was not whether it re-
sembled a real gun. 403 The court noted the Commonwealth assert-
ed at trial that Courtney's statement that he had a gun and
would use it, "combined with his opportunity to discard an actual
firearm," was sufficient to sustain the conviction.4 04 The supreme
court agreed with this argument.4 0 5
In Rowland v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed and dismissed the conviction for use of a firearm in the
commission of a burglary.4 0 6 Rowland entered a restaurant at
night, walked into the kitchen, pointed a firearm at an employee,
and demanded money from the cash register.4 0 7
The supreme court held Virginia Code section 18-2-53.1 re-
quired the use, attempted use, or display of a firearm in the
commission of the qualifying offense. 4 08 The court found a person
"uses" a firearm when he employs it.409 Furthermore, the supreme
court found a display of a firearm involves making the weapon
"manifest to any of a victim's senses."41 0 The court held that while
a defendant who commits burglary is responsible for events that
occur after his entry, the burglary is complete upon entry made
"with the requisite intent."4 11 Thus, the court concluded the evi-
dence was insufficient to prove use of a firearm in the commission
of burglary.4 1 2
In Dezfuli v. Commonwealth, the defendant, charged with use
of a firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of Virginia
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 366, 706 S.E.2d at 346.
404. Id. 368, 706 S.E.2d at 346-47.
405. Id.
406. 281 Va. 396, 402, 707 S.E.2d 331, 334 (2011).
407. Id. at 398, 707 S.E.2d at 332.
408. Id. at 401, 707 S.E.2d at 334 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-53.1 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
409. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1681 (9th ed. 2009)).
410. Id. at 401-02, 707 S.E.2d at 334 (quoting Cromite v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App.
64, 66, 348 S.E.2d 38, 39 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
411. Id. at 401, 707 S.E.2d at 334.
412. Id. at 402, 707 S.E.2d at 334.
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Code section 18.2-53. 1, 4 13 argued the trial court wrongly convicted
him of brandishing a firearm under Virginia Code section 18.2-
282414 as a lesser included offense."' The Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia applied the Blockburger test to determine whether bran-
dishing a firearm requires proof of a fact that use of a firearm in
the commission of a felony does not.416 The court concluded that
under this test brandishing a firearm was not a lesser included
offense of use of a firearm because "the Commonwealth must
submit proof, of completely different elements for a finding of
guilt" on each offense."' To convict the defendant of use of a fire-
arm in the commission of a felony, the court of appeals noted, "the
prosecution is not required to prove a criminal defendant actually
brandished his firearm."" Although it is likely that the defend-
ant would brandish the firearm while using it in the commission
of a felony, it is not necessarily so.419 The court noted that the el-
ements of the two statutes must be viewed in the abstract, and
"[the statute] is written in the disjunctive," permitting conviction
for using or displaying a firearm during the commission of a felo-
ny.420 In short, the court of appeals found that
the requirements of Blockburger [were] . . . not satisfied ... because
the Commonwealth can obtain a conviction for use of a firearm dur-
ing the commission of a felony without proof that the defendant
brandished the firearm, and it can obtain a conviction for brandish-
ing without also proving use of the firearm in the commission of a
felony. 421
413. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-53.1 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011) (making it "un-
lawful for any person to use or attempt to use any .. . firearm or display such weapon in a
threatening manner while committing or attempting to commit" certain enumerated felo-
nies).
414. Id. § 18.2-282 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
415. 58 Va. App. 1, 3-4, 7, 707 S.E.2d 1, 2-4 (2011).
416. Id. at 7-8, 707 S.E.2d at 4 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304
(1932)). "[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two district statuto-
ry provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Block-
burger, 284 U.S. at 304.
417. Dezfuli, 58 Va. App. at 11-12, 707 S.E.2d at 6.
418. Id. at 11, 707 S.E.2d at 6.
419. Id. at 10-11, 707 S.E.2d at 5-6.
420. Id. at 9-10, 707 S.E.2d at 5 (quoting Rose v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 505,
513-14, 673 S.E.2d 489, 493 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
421. Id. at 11-12, 707 S.E.2d at 6.
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I. Gang Crimes
The law continues to develop in the area of criminal street
gangs. A pair of decisions from the Court of Appeals of Virginia
are worthy of note. First, in Taybron v. Commonwealth, a prose-
cution under Virginia Code section 18.2-46.2, the court of appeals
examined whether the prosecution had satisfied the statutory re-
quirement that "members" of a particular gang had committed
"two or more predicate criminal acts."4 22 The prosecution present-
ed evidence that two individuals, Arenzo King and Jumar Turner,
committed predicate offenses.4 2 3 These individuals were members
of a homegrown local gang that is loosely affiliated with the na-
tional Bloods gang.4 2 4 The defendant belonged to the "36th Street
Bang Squad," which used adopted "symbols and ideologies associ-
ated with the national Bloods gang. "425 Turner and King, howev-
er, never belonged to 36th Street Bang Squad.4 2 6 The gang expert
testified for the Commonwealth that the 36th Street Bang Squad
was "affiliated with the Bloods, not a nationally known Blood set,
but a homegrown [set] using the same ideologies and . .. verbiage
and symbols used to rep Blood."42 7
The court of appeals concluded that since the evidence estab-
lished that Turner and King were not members "of the same local
or national 'ongoing organization, association, or group"' that the
defendant belonged to, the prosecution could not rely on predicate
crimes committed by Turner and King to establish the 36th
Street Bang Squad as a "criminal street gang."4 28 Although the
36th Street Bang Squad was "affiliated" with the Bloods, affilia-
tion, the court of appeals concluded, does not constitute member-
ship.42 9 The court rejected the argument that by claiming to be
422. 57 Va. App. 470, 471, 476, 703 S.E.2d 270, 271, 273-74 (2011) (quoting VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-46.2-416.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2011)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
423. Id. at 473-74, 703 S.E.2d at 272.
424. Id. at 474-75, 703 S.E.2d at 272-73.
425. Id. at 473, 703 S.E.2d at 272.
426. Id. at 474, 703 S.E.2d at 273
427. Id. at 479, 703 S.E.2d at 275.
428. Id. at 481-82, 703 S.E.2d at 276-77 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.1 (Repl. Vol.
2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
429. Id. at 481, 703 S.E.2d at 276.
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Bloods these individuals satisfied the membership requirement of
the statute.4 3 0
The court of appeals declined to "make any sort of blanket rul-
ing determining whether the Bloods or any other national group
which fits within the statutory definition of a criminal street gang
includes among its members the members of any local subset or
other local affiliate gang."a4 Instead, the court merely concluded
that "in this case, the evidence fail[ed] to establish that appellant,
a member of the 36th Street Bang Squad, was a member of the
national Bloods or some other gang organization to which Turner
and King also belonged."43 2
The second decision also dealt with predicate crimes. In Phil-
lips v. Commonwealth, the defendant was charged with recruiting
a juvenile into a criminal street gang.433 The Court of Appeals of
Virginia first parsed the language of Virginia Code sections 18.2-
46.1 and 18.2-46.2 and concluded that "the plain meaning of the
statute necessarily requires that the criminal acts establishing
the existence of the criminal street gang occur before, not contem-
poraneously with, the offense for which the existence of the crim-
inal street gang is required."4 3 4 Therefore, even if the defendant
did recruit a juvenile into the gang, this act of recruitment could
not serve as one of the predicate offenses to establish the exist-
ence of a criminal street gang.4 35
Furthermore, the Commonwealth was required to prove that
the gang existed "at the time" the defendant recruited the juvenile
into the gang.13 1 Consequently, evidence of gang crimes that oc-
curred after the defendant recruited the juvenile failed to satisfy
the statutory requirement for predicate acts.4 37
In addition, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of predi-
cate crimes committed by M.W. and Kevin Mitchell, who were
members of the Bloods, to establish the Bloods' status as a crimi-
430. Id. at 481-82, 703 S.E.2d at 276.
431. Id. at 485 n.6, 703 S.E.2d at 278 n.6.
432. Id.
433. 56 Va. App. 526,529-30, 694 S.E.2d 805, 806-07 (2010).
434. Id. at 536-37, 694 S.E.2d at 810 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-46.1, -46.2 (Repl.
Vol. 2009)).
435. Id. at 539-40, 694 S.E.2d at 811-12.
436. Id. at 538, 694 S.E.2d at 811.
437. Id. at 538-39, 694 S.E.2d at 811.
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nal street gang.' The problem with these particular predicate
crimes, the court of appeals found, was that no evidence estab-
lished when M.W. and Mitchell became gang members.4 39 To qual-
ify as predicates under Virginia Code section 18.2-46.1, the
crimes must be committed by persons who are members of the
gang when the crimes are committed.4 4 0 Proof that persons who at
some point joined the gang committed the criminal acts will not
suffice.4 4 1
Finally, the court of appeals agreed with the defendant's argu-
ment that when charging a defendant with recruiting into a gang
that includes a juvenile member, the prosecution "cannot simul-
taneously use [defendant's] recruitment of [a juvenile] to support
its position that [the defendant] attempted to recruit a juvenile
into a gang having a juvenile member."4 42
J. Identity Theft
Virginia law is strict on the issue of venue. To establish venue,
the prosecution must establish a strong presumption that the of-
fense took place in a particular jurisdiction.4 4 3 In Gheorghiu v.
Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia examined wheth-
er the prosecution tried the case on charges of identity theft in a
proper venue.4 44 Police apprehended the defendant in Arlington
County with a computer that contained the names and credit card
information of about one hundred persons.44 5 By statute, venue in
identity theft crimes can be established "in any locality where the
person whose identifying information was appropriated resides,
or in which any part of the offense took place, regardless of
whether the defendant was ever actually in such locality."4 6 The
438. Id. at 532-33, 694 S.E.2d at 808.
439. Id. at 539-40, 694 S.E.2d at 811-12.
440. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.1 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011)) (A
gang includes an "ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons,
whether formal or informal, . . whose members ... have engaged in the commission of ...
two or more predicate criminal acts.") (emphasis added).
441. Id. at 537-40, 694 S.E.2d at 810-12.
442. Id. at 541, 694 S.E.2d at 812.
443. Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 36, 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990).
444. 280 Va. 678, 683, 701 S.E.2d 407, 410 (2010).
445. Id. at 681-82, 701 S.E.2d at 409.
446. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.3 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
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victims who testified did not reside in Arlington County."' There-
fore, the question was whether any part of the offense had oc-
curred in Arlington County."' The Court of Appeals of Virginia
reasoned that identity theft was a "continuing offense" and,
therefore, the Commonwealth could establish venue anywhere
the defendant possessed "the victim's identifying information
with the intent to defraud.""'
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this rationale. The
court observed that the crime of identity theft occurs when the
perpetrator .'obtain[s], record[s], or access[es]' the owner's identi-
fying information without the owner's permission and with the
intent to defraud the owner."4 5 0 The crime is complete "when any
one of these acts occurs in conjunction with the intent to de-
fraud."4 5 1 The continued possession of the information, once ob-
tained, is not an element of the crime of identity theft.45 2 Because
the evidence failed to show a connection between any of the ac-
tions taken by the defendant and Arlington County, venue in Ar-
lington County was not proper.4 53 Gheorghiu is consistent with a
line of cases that restrict the idea of a "continuing offense" to the
crime of larceny.4 54
K. Indecent Exposure
The defendant in Simon v. Commonwealth argued the trial
court erred when it refused to grant him an instruction for the
crime of indecent exposure.4 5 5 Simon was charged with indecent
liberties, in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-370, and ar-
gued indecent exposure was a lesser included offense of indecent
447. Gheorghiu, 280 Va. at 682, 684,701 S.E.2d at 410.
448. Id. at 684, 701 S.E.2d at 410-11.
449. Id., 701 S.E.2d at 411 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
450. Id. at 686, 701 S.E.2d at 412 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.3 (Repl. Vol. &
Cum. Supp. 2011)).
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 687, 701 S.E.2d at 412.
454. See, e.g., Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 803-04, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639-40
(2007) (holding that venue to prosecute a defendant for credit card theft was improper in
the jurisdiction where defendant merely possessed stolen cards); Commonwealth v. Mon-
tague, 260 Va. 697, 702, 536 S.E.2d 910, 913 (2000) (rejecting the continuing offense doc-
trine for venue purposes with respect to felony-murder).
455. 58 Va. App. 194, 196, 708 S.E.2d 245, 246 (2011), petition for cert. filed, (Va. June
3, 2011) (No. 111030).
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liberties.4 5 6 The Court of Appeals of Virginia recognized that the
Supreme Court of Virginia previously stated in dicta that inde-
cent liberties included the lesser offense of indecent exposure.45 7
The court then addressed "whether the elements of the greater
offense necessarily include all elements of the lesser."458 The court
concluded that "[a] comparison of the elements of these crimes
confirms that indecent exposure is not lesser included in the in-
decent liberties offense charged in the indictment."4 59 First, the
intent differs because indecent liberties, as charged here, requires
the defendant expose himself "with lascivious intent."4 60 In con-
trast, indecent exposure "requires an 'intentionally' 'obscene' 'ex-
posure.' 4 6 1 Comparing these two terms, the court of appeals noted
that "although every exposure made with lascivious intent . . .
may also be an intentionally obscene exposure . . . the converse is
not true because the obscenity element of indecent exposure is
broader than the mere lascivious desire for 'sexual indulgence."462
In addition, the court observed that the two statutes differed on
the "age-related elements."4 6 3 Under the indecent liberties stat-
ute, the perpetrator must be eighteen or older, "whereas the inde-
cent exposure statute permits a conviction upon proof that the
perpetrator was [eighteen] or older or under [eighteen] ."464 In ad-
dition, "the indecent liberties statute requires proof that the vic-
tim was under [fifteen] and not married to the perpetrator,
whereas the indecent exposure statute does not require proof of
any particular victim at all."4 65 The only requirement is that the
indecent exposure occur "in any public place, or in any place
where others are present."4 66 In light of these differences, the
456. Id. at 196, 200-01, 708 S.E.2d at 248 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370 (Repl. Vol.
2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
457. Id. at 201-02, 708 S.E.2d at 249 (citing Ashby v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 443, 445
n.3, 158 S.E.2d 657, 658 n.3 (1968)).
458. Id. at 202, 708 S.E.2d at 249 (quoting Fontaine v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App.
156, 164, 487 S.E.2d 241, 245 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Edwards v. Common-
wealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 765, 589 S.E.2d 444, 450 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
459. Id. at 204, 708 S.E.2d at 250.
460. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
461. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-387 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011)).
462. Id. at 204-05, 708 S.E.2d at 250.
463. Id. at 205, 708 S.E.2d at 250.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id.
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court of appeals concluded that the trial court committed no er-
ror when it refused to give jury instructions on indecent expo-
sure.467
L. Knowingly Communicating a Written Threat
Virginia Code section 18.2-60(A)(1) prohibits knowingly com-
municating a written threat..46  The defendant in Holcomb v.
Commonwealth argued the statute did not apply to his MySpace
posts, and, moreover, the evidence was insufficient for convic-
tion.4 69 The defendant, who was in a custody battle with a woman
named Miranda Rollman, posted a number of entries on his
MySpace profile, addressed to the "[W]oodroll family."470 The
posts stated, for example, "B***h made me go mad I just had to
stab her" and "Ain't nobody playin' b***h[,] slit your neck into a
fountain drink."47 1 Rollman, whose maiden name was Woodroll,
saw the posts and testified the posts made her afraid.47 2 The de-
fendant, who fancied himself a "lyricist of [rap] music," defended
the postings as art.' Although he acknowledged that others, in-
cluding Rollman and her family, might view the postings, the de-
fendant argued that the postings were for everyone to view and
were not directed specifically at Rollman. 7 ' The Court of Appeals
of Virginia rejected this argument, noting that communication of
a threat to a wide audience does not alter the fact that a threat
was communicated. 47 5 The court concluded that the defendant's
postings constituted an "electronically transmitted communica-
tion" that produced a "visual or electronic message" as required
under the statute.4 7 6 The defendant knowingly posted the mes-
sages that constituted threats, and the statute required "nothing
more" for a conviction.' The court of appeals also found the evi-
467. Id. at 205, 708 S.E.2d at 251.
468. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
469. 58 Va. App. 339, 342, 345-46, 709 S.E.2d 711, 712, 714 (2011).
470. Id. at 342-43, 709 S.E.2d at 712-13.
471. Id. at 343, 709 S.E.2d at 713.
472. Id. at 344, 709 S.E.2d at 713.
473. Id.
474. Id. at 345-46, 709, S.E.2d at 713-14.
475. Id. at 346-47, 709 S.E.2d at 714.
476. Id. at 347, 709 S.E.2d at 715 (quoting VA, CODE ANN. § 18.2-60(A)(1) (Repl. Vol.
2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
477. Id.
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dence sufficient to find the message was a threat, concluding that
"the graphic and violent imagery used in the messages specifical-
ly referred to Rollman and her family."47 8 The court further ob-
served that "the specificity of the posts relating to [the defend-
ant's] tumultuous history with Rollman and her family makes
clear that [the defendant's] posts were directed towards Rollman
and not meant to be mere expression."4 7 9
M. Larceny
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Ali v. Commonwealth, ap-
plied the ends of justice exception to the contemporaneous objec-
tion rule and reversed a conviction of grand larceny from the per-
son.48 0 Ali entered a convenience store, asked for a cigar displayed
behind the counter, and tendered a dollar to pay for the cigar.4 8 1
When the cashier opened the cash register drawer, Ali reached
across the counter and tried to grab a fistful of money.4 82 As the
cashier and Ali struggled over the cash, the cashier screamed for
help from her mother, and Ali eventually took the money from the
cashier and fled the store.4 8 3 A jury convicted Ali of robbery and
grand larceny from the person and sentenced him to twelve years
for the robbery and five years for the larceny.4 8 4 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the convictions.4 85
The Supreme Court of Virginia found the evidence sufficient to
support Ali's robbery conviction.4 8 6 While acknowledging that
"grand larceny from the person is not a lesser-included offense of
robbery" under the Blockburger test, the court addressed Ali's ar-
gument that the Commonwealth's reliance on an inconsistency
"at the core" of its case violated his due process rights.4 8 7 Mi ad-
mitted he failed to raise this argument at trial. 4 88 The supreme
478. Id. at 349, 709 S.E.2d at 716.
479. Id.
480. 280 Va. 665, 670-71, 701 S.E.2d 64, 67-68 (2010).
481. Id. at 667, 701 S.E.2d at 66.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 668, 701 S.E.2d at 66.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 669, 701 S.E.2d at 66.
487. Id. at 669-70, 701 S.E.2d at 67 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,
304 (1932)).
488. Id. at 670, 701 S.E.2d at 68.
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court, however, concluded that asportation, an element of grand
larceny from the person, never occurred, so the court of appeals
erroneously failed to apply the ends of justice exception of Rule
5A:18.48 9 The supreme court, therefore, affirmed the robbery con-
viction and reversed the conviction for grand larceny from the
person.9 o
Larceny convictions often depend on the defendant's intent at
the time he committed the offense. In Marsh v. Commonwealth, a
judge convicted the defendant of larceny after he pawned his girl-
friend's jewelry and other items without her permission and later
failed to redeem them.491' The defendant contended that he
planned to redeem the items and, therefore, lacked the intent to
permanently deprive his girlfriend of the jewelry.' In analyzing
the sufficiency of the evidence of criminal intent, the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia noted that "the . . . intent to steal must exist at
the time the seized goods are moved,"49 3 but that intent may "be
inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case, including
the actions of the defendant and any statements made by him."4 94
"[O]ne who takes another's property intending at the time he
takes it to use it temporarily and then to return it unconditionally
within a reasonable time-and having a substantial ability to do
so-lacks the intent to steal required for larceny."4 9 5 Specifically,
the court of appeals reasoned that "an intent to pawn the proper-
ty, accompanied by an intent later to redeem the property and re-
turn it to its owner, is a defense only if the taker's financial situa-
tion is such that he has an ability to redeem it."496
Applying these principles, the court concluded the evidence
was sufficient to establish an intent to permanently deprive the
489. Id. at 670-71, 701 S.E.2d at 67-68 (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 5A, R. 5A:18 (Repl.
Vol. 2011)).
490. Id. at 671, 701 S.E.2d at 68.
491. 57 Va. App. 645, 648-50, 704 S.E.2d 624, 625-27 (2010).
492. Id. at 650, 704 S.E.2d at 626.
493. Id. at 651, 704 S.E.2d at 627 (quoting Carter v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 100, 105,
694 S.E.2d 590, 593-94 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
494. Id. (quoting Tarpley v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 251, 256, 542 S.E.2d 761, 764
(2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
495. Id. (quoting Carter, 280 Va. at 107, 694 S.E.2d at 595) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
496. Id. at 652, 704 S.E.2d at 628 (quoting 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 19.5(b), at 91 (2d ed. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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owner of her property.4 97 In light of the defendant's financial situ-
ation, there simply was no way he would be able to redeem the
items.4 98 The defendant testified he pawned the property because
of his financial problems.4 " To redeem the items, he needed
$3,272.50.500 However, his only job paid him $2000, and he also
owed money on other bills. 50 The court of appeals concluded the
defendant "had neither the present ability nor the prospective
ability at the time he took the items because of his financial situ-
ation to return the property. Thus, he did not have the substan-
tial ability [to repay], and his stated intent to return the property
[was] not a defense to larceny."5 02
In Williams v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
examined whether the defendant's actions made him guilty of lar-
ceny of an automobile when the evidence showed that he neither
drove nor stole the car.5 03 Another individual drove the stolen
jeep, in which the defendant was a passenger, to pick up one of
the defendant's friends. 50 4 The defendant, however, told his friend
the vehicle was stolen, and a witness heard the defendant state
that "so far today we haven't gotten arrested.""0 On the way to a
store, the trio stopped to talk to the defendant's cousin, then
walked to the defendant's house, and later returned to the stolen
vehicle.5 6 In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court
noted that "[b]ecause larceny is a continuing offense, anyone who
knows that personal property is stolen and assists in its transpor-
tation or disposition is guilty of larceny."o5 0 A principal in the se-
cond degree can be held criminally liable for committing an overt
act such as "encouraging, advising, or assisting in the commission
of the crime."0 8 Simply being a passenger in a stolen automobile
497. Id. at 656, 704 S.E.2d at 629.
498. Id. at 655, 704 S.E.2d at 629.
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. 56 Va. App. 638, 642, 696 S.E.2d 233, 235 (2010).
504. Id. at 641, 696 S.E.2d at 234.
505. Id., 696 S.E.2d at 234-35.
506. Id.
507. Id. at 643, 696 S.E.2d at 285 (quoting Hampton v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App.
644, 650-51, 529 S.E.2d 843, 846) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
508. Id. at 644, 696 S.E.2d at 236 (quoting Moehring v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 564,
567, 290 S.E.2d 891, 892 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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"do[es] not constitute sufficient evidence to convict a person as a
principal in the second degree."' However, a conviction does not
require the principal in the second degree to actually drive the
vehicle."o Here, the court of appeals reasoned, the defendant act-
ed as more than a passenger.1 1 The defendant showed his guilty
mind through his statement to his companions that they had not
been arrested and his acknowledgment that they stole the
[j]eep.5 12 The court found that "using the [j]eep to accommodate a
friend, meet a family member, and ride to his own home" showed
that the defendant "exercised some control over the movement
and destination of the stolen [j]eep."5 13 Based on this evidence the
fact-finder reasonably concluded that these steps occurred at the
request of the defendant.5 1 4 The defendant's joint control and,
therefore, joint possession of the stolen property established his
guilt as a principal in the second degree. 15
N. Malicious Wounding and Wounding by Mob
Following an altercation in a fast food restaurant parking lot,
the defendant in Johnson v. Commonwealth was convicted of both
malicious wounding and maiming by mob. 1 ' He argued his con-
victions under both statutes violated the prohibition against dou-
ble jeopardy but the Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected this ar-
gument.1 7 Analyzing the elements of the two offenses in the
abstract, the court noted the malicious wounding by mob stat-
ute518 contained the element of "the existence of a mob" that the
malicious wounding statute5 1 1 lacked.5 20 In addition, malicious
wounding by mob does not require malice.5 21 Instead, the prosecu-
509. Id. (quoting Moehring, 223 Va. at 567, 290 S.E.2d at 892)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
510. See id. at 645, 696 S.E.2d at 236.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id. at 645-46, 696 S.E.2d at 236-37.
514. Id. at 645, 696 S.E.2d at 237.
515. Id. at 644-45, 696 S.E.2d at 236.
516. 58 Va. App. 303, 311, 319, 709 S.E.2d 175, 180, 183 (2011).
517. Id. at 322, 709 S.E.2d at 185.
518. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-41 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
519. Id. § 18.2-51 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
520. Johnson, 58 Va. App. at 323, 709 S.E.2d at 185.
521. Id. at 327, 709 S.E.2d at 187.
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tion need only prove the unlawfulness of the wounding.52 2 Even
though the malicious wounding statute creates two crimes, mali-
cious wounding and unlawful wounding, malicious wounding re-
mains a distinct crime with distinct elements.5 2 3
0. Sexual Battery
In Nicholson v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virgin-
ia affirmed Woodrow Wilson Nicholson's conviction "of aggravated
sexual battery, through the use of an adult victim's mental inca-
pacity, in violation of Code § 18.2-67.3."1524 The victim in the case
was "severely mentally retarded" and lacked an understanding of
sexual matters. 525 An employee observed the defendant speaking
with the victim near the training facility, where the victim was a
client.' When the concerned employee later went looking for the
victim, she found him standing near the defendant in an alley
and noticed the defendant's pants were open, exposing his pe-
nis.527 The trial court, as fact finder, expressly rejected the de-
fendant's testimony that the victim offered to touch the defend-
ant's penis for money.5 28 The defendant argued the Common-
wealth must prove the use of force by the defendant.5 2 9 The trial
court concluded the Commonwealth satisfied the proof of con-
structive force and convicted Nicholson of aggravated sexual bat-
tery.530
In affirming the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia held that a person deemed mentally incapacitated under
Virginia Code section 18.2-67.10(3)531 "is incapable of consenting
to sexual touching, on the grounds that 'consent without under-
522. Id. at 324, 709 S.E.2d at 186 (quoting Paiz v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 688,
698, 682 S.E.2d 71, 76 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
523. Id. at 326, 709 S.E.2d at 187 ("[M]alicious wounding and unlawful wounding must
be treated as distinct offenses codified together in the same statute.").
524. 56 Va. App. 491, 493, 694 S.E.2d 788, 789 (2010) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.3
(Repl. Vol. 2009)).
525. Id. at 495, 497, 694 S.E.2d at 790-91.
526. Id. at 493-94, 694 S.E.2d at 789.
527. Id. at 494, 694 S.E.2d at 789.
528. Id. at 498, 694 S.E.2d at 791.
529. Id.
530. Id. (stating that the victim's mental incapacity prevented him from legally con-
senting, therefore proving the defendant constructively forced the victim to touch him).
531. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.10(3) (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
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standing is no consent at all."' 32 The court of appeals concluded
that Virginia Code section 18.2-67.3 does not require use of actual
force when the victim is mentally incapacitated."
V. SENTENCING AND PROBATION
A. Allocution at Sentencing
In Montgomery v. Commonwealth, Jonathan Christopher
Montgomery argued on appeal that he should receive a new sen-
tencing hearing on his convictions for forcible sodomy, aggravated
sexual battery, and object sexual penetration because the trial
court failed to afford him his right to allocution at his sentencing
proceeding.5 34 The Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected this ar-
gument.'3
Following a bench trial, a judge convicted Montgomery of three
sex offenses. 536 At his sentencing hearing, although the trial court
asked Montgomery if he had any questions before the court an-
nounced its sentence, the trial court never gave him an oppor-
tunity to make a statement.5 3 7 Montgomery made no objection at
the sentencing hearing to the trial court's oversight, but at a bail
hearing held immediately after the sentencing hearing Montgom-
ery's counsel brought the error to the trial court's attention.5 38
The trial court acknowledged it failed to provide for allocution
and offered the defendant the chance to make a statement at that
time, for the record, but noted the sentence would not change.53 9
The defendant chose not to proffer a statement.5 4 0
The court of appeals noted that, pursuant to Virginia Code sec-
tion 19.2-298, a court must inquire if a defendant desires to make
a statement or desires to "advance any reason why judgment
should not be pronounced against him" before pronouncing the
532. Nicholson, 56 Va. App. at 510, 694 S.E.2d at 797 (quoting Motina v. Common-
wealth, 47 Va. App. 338, 358, 624 S.E.2d 83, 92 (2006)).
533. See id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.3 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
534. 56 Va. App. 695, 699, 696 S.E.2d 261, 262-63 (2010).
535. Id., 696 S.E.2d at 262.
536. Id.
537. Id., 696 S.E.2d at 263.
538. Id.
539. Id. at 699-700, 696 S.E.2d at 263.
540. Id. at 700, 696 S.E.2d at 263.
1132011]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
sentence.5 4 1 The court held, however, the right of allocation is
purely a statutory right; thus, a failure to comply does not consti-
tute structural error, and harmless error analysis is appropri-
ate.54 2 The court concluded Montgomery's failure to proffer his de-
sired allocution statement was fatal to his claim.5 43 The court held
that without a proffer it could only "speculate as to the contents"
of any statement in allocution and, therefore, was unable to de-
termine whether the error was prejudicial. 54 4 As a result, the
court of appeals concluded the error was harmless.4
B. Juvenile Sentencing
In Angel v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia ad-
dressed a claim based on Graham v. Florida. 546 In Graham, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that imposing a life sen-
tence without any possibility of early release on a juvenile de-
fendant for a nonhomicide offense violated the Eighth Amend-
ment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment."
In Angel, the defendant, a juvenile at the time of the offenses,
was sentenced to three consecutive life sentences plus a term of
years for nonhomicide felonies.' In his direct appeal in the su-
preme court, Angel alleged that because Virginia, like Florida,
had eliminated parole under Graham, the court should vacate his
life sentences.5 4 9 The supreme court unanimously rejected Angel's
claim.5 o The court noted the Supreme Court of the United States
left it to the states "to devise methods of allowing juvenile offend-
ers an opportunity for release based on maturity and rehabilita-
tion" and "did not require that states provide the opportunity for
541. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298 (Cum. Supp. 2011)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
542. Id. at 700-02, 696 S.E.2d at 263-64.
543. Id. at 704-05, 696 S.E.2d at 265.
544. Id. at 704, 696 S.E.2d at 265.
545. Id. at 706, 696 S.E.2d at 266.
546. 281 Va. 248, 274, 704 S.E.2d 386, 401 (2011), cert. denied, _U.S. -, 2011 U.S.
LEXIS 7091 (Oct. 3, 2011) (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 2011,
2034 (2010)).
547. 560 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
548. Angel, 281 Va. at 257, 260, 273, 704 S.E.2d at 391, 393, 401.
549. Id. at 274, 704 S.E.2d at 401.
550. Id.
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release at any particular time related to either the offender's age
or length of incarceration."51
The court then recited Virginia Code section 53.1-40.01, which
provides that anyone serving a sentence, other than for capital
murder, who has reached age sixty-five and has served five years,
or has reached age sixty and has served ten years, "may petition
the Parole Board for conditional release."55 2 The court concluded
that although the statute "has an age qualifier," it provides a
"'meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation' required by the Eighth Amend-
ment."553
C. Violation of the Terms of Probation
The defendant in Carroll v. Commonwealth contended that re-
fusing to admit his guilt during a treatment course ordered by the
trial court did not violate the terms of his probation.' Pursuant
to a plea agreement, the defendant entered an Alford plea' to a
charge of raping a child under the age of thirteen.5 5 ' The trial
court imposed a suspended sentence and ordered the defendant to
participate in any treatment prescribed by the probation of-
ficer."' Carroll's probation officer instructed him to attend sex of-
fender therapy.5 5 1 When he refused to admit his guilt during two
months of treatment, the trial court revoked his probation.5
Carroll argued that a defendant who entered an Alford plea can-
not be made to admit his guilt, particularly when the trial court
never informed the defendant that he may have to admit his
guilt.560
551. Id. at 275, 704 S.E.2d at 402.
552. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2011)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
553. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__ , 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)).
554. 280 Va. 641, 644, 701 S.E.2d 414, 415 (2010).
555. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). In Alford, the Court held that
"[a]n individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly con-
sent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his
participation in the acts constituting the crime." Id.
556. Carroll, 280 Va. at 645-46, 701 S.E.2d at 416.
557. Id. at 646, 701 S.E.2d at 416.
558. Id. at 647, 701 S.E.2d at 417.
559. Id.
560. Id. at 650, 701 S.E.2d at 418.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia, after examining both relevant
Virginia precedent and persuasive precedent from other state and
federal courts, concluded that the trial court did not err in finding
the defendant in violation of the terms of his probation.56 1 Fur
thermore, a trial court must inform the defendant only "of the di-
rect consequences" of his plea, not collateral consequences.5 6 2 The
failure of the trial court to warn the defendant that he may have
to admit guilt was a collateral consequence and, therefore, "d[id]
not render the revocation improper."563
Finally, the supreme court rejected the defendant's argument
that, under the circumstances, the trial court should have offered
"an alternative treatment modality" rather than revoke his pro-
bation. 564 The failure to successfully complete the treatment did
not stem from "some inability resulting from an unforeseen condi-
tion that arose."56 5 Instead, the defendant's inability to complete
the conditions of probation stemmed from to his 'willful failure
... to comply with the requirements' of his probation officer. "566
VI. LEGISLATION
With respect to pretrial criminal procedure, the General As-
sembly clearly established that, despite the change that Melen-
dez-Diaz necessitates for trials, the prosecution may rely on
signed affidavits of a competent government official in prelimi-
nary hearings to prove a diligent search failed to produce any of-
ficial record.' In addition, with respect to certificates of analysis
for driving under the influence, the General Assembly amended
the law to allow the prosecution to file a copy with the clerk with-
in three days of providing the copy to the accused, rather than on
the same day.6
561. See id. at 650-53, 701 S.E.2d at 418-20.
562. Id. at 653, 701 S.E.2d at 420 (quoting State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarts, 579
N.W.2d 698, 708 (Wis. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
563. Id.
564. Id. at 653-54, 701 S.E.2d at 420-21.
565. Id. at 654, 701 S.E.2d at 421.
566. Id. (quoting Peyton v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 503, 511, 604 S.E.2d 17, 21 (2004)).
567. Act of Mar. 18, 2011, ch. 285, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-188.3 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
568. Act of Mar. 10, 2011, ch. 32, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified as amended VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
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Prior law permitted placing the affidavit for certain search
warrants temporarily under seal.'"6 An amendment explicitly
states that, in addition to the affidavit, the search warrant itself,
the return made on the warrant, and the order sealing the affida-
vit can be sealed for a period of time.o70 Furthermore, when order-
ing the disclosure of records involving electronic communication
services or remote computing services, courts may, upon a show-
ing of good cause, seal the order and application or statement of
facts for ninety days. 7 ' Finally, certain unexecuted warrants can
be destroyed or dismissed.5 72
Furthermore, the General Assembly imposed new conditions
for release on and payment of bonds. Courts can now order GPS
tracking for persons released on a secured bond or as a condition
of probation for a suspended sentence.5 73 Additionally, defendants
must pay "[b]onds in recognizances in criminal or juvenile cases"
to the jurisdiction where the recognizance was taken, regardless
of whether the crime violated the laws of the commonwealth or
the locality.7
The General Assembly also passed amendments for crimes in-
volving sexual assault, alcohol, and drugs. For sodomy and un-
lawful intercourse with a minor, a more flexible venue is now
possible in the jurisdiction where the crime allegedly occurred, or,
with the consent of the Commonwealth's Attorney, either in the
jurisdiction where the defendant committed the crime or where
the defendant transported the victim prior to committing the of-
fense.17' The General Assembly expanded the definition of law-
enforcement officers by adding agents of the Alcohol Beverage
Control Board to the list of law-enforcement personnel against
whom an assault rises to a Class 6 felony, which carries a manda-
569. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-54 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
570. Act of Mar. 16, 2011, ch. 219, 2011 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-54 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
571. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-70.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 2011).
572. Id. § 19.2-76.1 (Cum. Supp. 2011).
573. Id. §§ 19.2-123, -303 (Cum. Supp. 2011).
574. Id. §§ 19.2-136, -143 (Cum. Supp. 2011).
575. Id. § 18.2-359(D) (Cum. Supp. 2011).
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tory minimum sentence of six months.5 " This legislation effec-
tively overturned the decision in Cline v. Commonwealth."
A new amendment explicitly allows prosecutors to enforce the
civil offense of refusing to submit to a blood alcohol test.57 8 In ad-
dition, driving after consuming alcohol while under the age of
twenty-one now qualifies as a Class 1 misdemeanor.7 Under pri-
or law, the punishment only involved suspension of the driver's
license and a possible fines.5 " Finally, after widespread press re-
ports concerning the availability of "synthetic marijuana," the
General Assembly banned such substances."'
576. Act of Mar. 18, 2011, ch. 230, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-57(C), (F) (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
577. 53 Va. App. 765, 770, 675 S.E.2d 223, 235 (2009) (holding that the legislature nev-
er intended for the statute to include Alcohol and Beverage Control agents as law en-
forcement officers).
578. Act of Mar. 16, 2011, ch. 210, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-1627(B) (Cum. Supp. 2011)). This change effectively codifies the holding in
Kozmina v. Commonwealth, which found that Commonwealth Attorneys had the authority
to prosecute civil refusals. 281 Va. 347, 352, 706 S.E.2d 860, 863 (2011).
579. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2011).
580. Id. § 18.2-266.1 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
581. Act of Mar. 23, 2011, ch. 410, 2011 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
248.1:1 (Cum. Supp. 2011)); VA. STATE CRIME COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT, at 68-69 (June
23, 2011).
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